Basic deviance reconsidered

Schlosser, Markus E.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00673.x

Cited by 18 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…On Schlosser's 12 Similar proposals in defense of nonreductive physicalism in the literature that can be justifiably labeled as "intralevelist" can be found in Crisp and Warfield 2001, Marras 1997, and Yablo 1992. 13 Schlosser defends the CTA in Schlosser 2007Schlosser , 2010aSchlosser , and 2010b The rising interest in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, especially her seminal work, Intention (1957/2000), has raised doubts in my mind about just how accurate it is to label CTA the "standard story" these days. At the very least, the standard story is becoming less standard among those working in the philosophy of action.…”

Section: Expanding the Supervenience Basementioning

confidence: 91%

Intralevel Mental Causation

Buckareff¹

2011

Frontiers of Philosophy in China

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call "intralevelism." Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.

show abstract

Section: Expanding the Supervenience Basementioning

confidence: 91%

Intralevel Mental Causation

Buckareff¹

2011

Frontiers of Philosophy in China

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…5 Some proponents of the causal theory of action, for example, have suggested that beliefs, desires, or intentions constitute an agent's reasons for acting if they cause him to act in a manner that is sensitive to or in virtue of their content (Bishop 1989, chap. 4;Schlosser 2007). Yet, regardless of how one exactly understands such content sensitivity, whether primarily in terms of counterfactual or lawlike correlations, just being told that an agent's behavior is caused by his intention to count the blades of grass in such a context-sensitive manner still does explicate how such an intention can count as a reason for acting or as a consideration speaking in favor of the agent's behavior.…”

Section: Understanding Reasons For Actingmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Causal Autonomy of Reason Explanations and How Not to Worry about Causal Deviance

Stueber

2012

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This essay will defend a causal conception of action explanations in terms of an agent's reasons by delineating a metaphysical and epistemic framework that allows us to view folk psychology as providing us with causal and autonomous explanatory strategies of accounting for individual agency. At the same time, I will calm philosophical concerns about the issue of causal deviance that have been at the center of the recent debates between causalist and noncausalist interpretations of action explanations. For that purpose, it is important to realize that the domain of folk-psychological action explanation is also the domain of skillful and goal-directed bodily movements, a domain to which we have independent epistemic access.

show abstract

“…The state of nervousness, which connects the intention to the movement, preserves the relation of causation, but it does not preserve the relation of being causally relevant and explanatory in virtue of content. Cases of basic deviance can therefore be excluded by the condition that the rationalizing mental antecedents must be causally efficacious and explanatory in virtue of their intentional contents (Schlosser 2007).…”

Section: Causal Deviance In Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of rule-following

Schlosser

2010

Philos Stud

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke's (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil's (Philos Perspect 12:283-312, 1998) realist response to Kripke's challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (Philos Stud 140:285-298, 2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rulefollowing.Keywords Rule-following Á Reasoning Á Deviant causal chains Á Dispositions Á Metaphysics of mind Á Metaphysics of agency The causal-dispositional approachWhat happens, metaphysically speaking, when we make an inference or perform an action on the basis of reasoning? It is widely assumed that instances of reasoning and rational agency consist in transitions of certain kinds of states and events: they are chains of mental states, mental events, and overt behavior. Paradigm examples are the formation of beliefs on the basis of antecedent beliefs (theoretical reasoning), the formation of intentions on the basis of beliefs, desires, and prior

show abstract

Basic deviance reconsidered

Cited by 18 publications

References 11 publications

Intralevel Mental Causation

Intralevel Mental Causation

The Causal Autonomy of Reason Explanations and How Not to Worry about Causal Deviance

The metaphysics of rule-following

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About