Basic Beliefs and the Perceptual Learning Problem: A Substantial Challenge for Moderate Foundationalism

Vaassen, Bram

doi:10.1017/epi.2015.58

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 37 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Perceptual learning has emerged as an alternate way of explaining the sort of learning that takes place from novice to expert (Ransom 2020; Connolly 2019; Brogaard and Gatzia 2018; Chomanski and Chudnoff 2018; Chudnoff 2018; Vaassen 2016). It is an enduring functional change in the perceptual system that results in a long-term change in the contents of our perceptual experience (Goldstone 1998; Gibson and Gibson 1955).…”

Section: Perceptual Expertise and Perceptual Learningmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Expert Knowledge by Perception

Ransom¹

2020

Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

AbstractDoes the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form.

show abstract

Section: Perceptual Expertise and Perceptual Learningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 7 For alternate ways of motivating the claim that learned perception provides only mediate justification see (Vaassen 2016; M. McGrath 2017, pp. 30–34).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Expert Knowledge by Perception

Ransom¹

2020

Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While it is beyond doubt that perceptual learning is a philosophically interesting phenomenon with crucial implications for philosophy of mind, it is only very recently that researchers have begun to investigate whether we can draw genuinely epistemological lessons from this (cf. Brogaard and Gatzia 2017;Chudnoff 2017;Siegel 2017;Vaassen 2016). Does perceptual learning tell us something about experiential justification?…”

Section: Exemplifying the Relevance Of Experimental Psychology 3: Permentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology

Berghofer

2020

Journal of Transcendental Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.

show abstract

“…126–8) discusses and rejects several responses on behalf of the dogmatist which I will not rehearse here. Also see Vaassen (2016) for more about this perceptual learning problem for dogmatism.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One difficulty this view faces has to do with explaining what goes wrong when one has used an unjustified belief about looks to calibrate one's perceptual processes without making those processes any less reliable. See Vaassen (2016) for a discussion of this problem.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Ghijsen¹

2020

Philosophical Issues

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks-related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.

show abstract

Basic Beliefs and the Perceptual Learning Problem: A Substantial Challenge for Moderate Foundationalism

Cited by 6 publications

References 37 publications

Expert Knowledge by Perception

Expert Knowledge by Perception

Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About