Basic Autonomy as a Fundamental Step in the Synthesis of Life

Abstract

In the search for the primary roots of autonomy (a pivotal concept in Varela's comprehensive understanding of living beings), the theory of autopoiesis provided an explicit criterion to define minimal life in universal terms, and was taken as a guideline in the research program for the artificial synthesis of biological systems. Acknowledging the invaluable contribution of the autopoietic school to present biological thinking, we offer an alternative way of conceiving the most basic forms of autonomy. We give a bottom-up account of the origins of "self-production" (or self-construction, as we propose to call it), pointing out which are the minimal material and energetic requirements for the constitution of basic autonomous systems. This account is, indeed, committed to the project of developing a general theory of biology, but well grounded in the universal laws of physics and chemistry. We consider that the autopoietic theory was formulated in highly abstract terms and, in order to advance in the implementation of minimal autonomous systems (and, at the same time, make major progress in exploring the origins of life), a more specific characterization of minimal autonomous systems is required. Such a characterization will not be drawn from a review of the autopoietic criteria and terminology (à la Fleischaker) but demands a whole reformulation of the question: a proper naturalization of the concept of autonomy. Finally, we also discuss why basic autonomy, according to our account, is necessary but not sufficient for life, in contrast with Varela's idea that autopoiesis was a necessary and sufficient condition for it.

The World as Evolving Information

“…Autopoiesis is perhaps the most salient one, which notes that living systems are self-producing (Varela et al, 1974;McMullin, 2004). Still, it has been argued that autopoiesis is a necessary but not sufficient property for life (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2004). The relevance of autonomy (Barandarian, 2004;Moreno and Ruiz-Mirazo, 2006;Krakauer and Zanotto, 2007) and individuality (Michod, 2000;Krakauer and Zanotto, 2007) for life have also been highlighted .…”

Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency

“…For monists such higher order ensembles appear always subordinated to the one and only form of autonomy that ultimately anchors the normative and regulatory principles of the higher orders (see Christensen and Hooker 2000 for a prototypical example). A pluralist approach opens the way to conceive of different types of autonomy: the autonomy of the cell (Bechtel 2007a;Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004), the autonomy of multicellular organisms (Arnellos et al 2014;Rosslenbroich 2009), the autonomy of behaviour (Barandiaran 2004;Barandiaran and Moreno 2006b;Smithers 1997), the autonomy of inter-subjective interaction (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007;De Jaegher et al (2010) the autonomy of the social (Luhmann 1986(Luhmann , 1995, or the political (Adams 2007;Castoriadis 1997), etc. At each level a new phenomenological domain is opened, new forms of identity and novel types of norms emerge.…”

Enactive autonomy in computational systems

“…From a formal systemic approach, autonomy has to do with the closed (circular) organization present in certain systems (Varela 1979;Thompson 2007;Barandiaran 2016). Finally, from a more concrete and bottom-up approach, autonomy has to do with the constitutive precariousness of those systems that, as is paradigmatically the case in living organisms, need to sustain themselves and counteract the tendency towards thermodynamic decay (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014;Di Paolo 2009;Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004). According to CE, "an autonomous system is a self-determining system, as distinguished from a system determined from the outside, or a heteronomous system" (Thompson 2007, p. 37).…”