Barter trade improves message delivery in opportunistic networks

Buttyán, Levente; Dóra, László; Félegyházi, Márk; Vajda, István

doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2009.02.005

Cited by 91 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…The existing incentive strategies are traditionally classified into three categories [4,8]: barter-based [4,3,59], credit-based [8,43,63,37,62] and reputation-based [1,56,11,57,37,28]. In the following subsections, we will introduce the representative strategies in each category and summarize their common problems.…”

Section: Strategies For Preventing Selfish Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The simplest strategies are barter-based or pair-wise Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategies [4,3,59]. The mechanism is that two encountering nodes exchange the same amount of messages.…”

Section: Barter-based Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, each message has a potential value, which is employed to prevent selfish behavior. Moreover, the authors in [4,59] consider the message selection process as a two-person game, and utilize the Nash Equilibrium [41] to increase the message delivery ratio.…”

Section: Barter-based Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The mechanism is that two encountering nodes exchange the same amount of messages. In [4,3], the authors divide the messages into two categories: primary messages and secondary messages. For a given node, the messages in which it is interested (e.g., the messages destined for it) are primary messages.…”

Section: Barter-based Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

An investigation on the unwillingness of nodes to participate in mobile delay tolerant network routing

Miao¹,

Hasan²,

Mokhtar³

et al. 2013

International Journal of Information Management

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Message routing in mobile delay tolerant networks inherently relies on the cooperation between nodes. In most existing routing protocols, the participation of nodes in the routing process is taken as granted. However, in reality, nodes can be unwilling to participate. We first show in this paper the impact of the unwillingness of nodes to participate in existing routing protocols through a set of experiments. Results show that in the presence of even a small proportion of nodes that do not forward messages, performance is heavily degraded. We then analyze two major reasons of the unwillingness of nodes to participate, i.e., their rational behavior (also called selfishness) and their wariness of disclosing private mobility information.Our main contribution in this paper is to survey the existing related research works that overcome these two issues. We provide a classification of the existing approaches for protocols that deal with selfish behavior. We then conduct experiments to compare the performance of these strategies for preventing different types of selfish behavior. For protocols that preserve the privacy of users, we classify the existing approaches and provide an analytical comparison of their security guarantees.

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Section: Strategies For Preventing Selfish Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The simplest strategies are barter-based or pair-wise Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategies [4,3,59]. The mechanism is that two encountering nodes exchange the same amount of messages.…”

Section: Barter-based Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Barter-based Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Barter-based Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An investigation on the unwillingness of nodes to participate in mobile delay tolerant network routing

Miao¹,

Hasan²,

Mokhtar³

et al. 2013

International Journal of Information Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The existing incentive schemes to address the selfishness problem basically fall into three categories: reputation-based [18][19][20], barter-based [10,21,22], and credit-based [12][13][14][15][16].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Credit-Based Congestion-Aware Incentive Scheme for DTNs

2016

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Abstract:In Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTNs), nodes may be selfish and reluctant to expend their precious resources on forwarding messages for others. Therefore, an incentive scheme is necessary to motivate selfish nodes to cooperatively forward messages. However, the current incentive schemes mainly focus on encouraging nodes to participate in message forwarding, without considering the node congestion problem. When many messages are forwarded to the nodes with high connection degree, these nodes will become congested and deliberately discard messages, which will seriously degrade the routing performance and reduce the benefits of other nodes. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based congestion-aware incentive scheme (CBCAIS) for DTNs. In CBCAIS, a check and punishment mechanism is proposed to prevent forwarding nodes from deliberately discarding message. In addition, a message acceptance selection mechanism is proposed to allow the nodes to decide whether to accept other messages, according to self congestion degree. The experimental results show that CBCAIS can effectively stimulate selfish nodes to cooperatively forward messages, and achieve a higher message delivery ratio with lower overhead ratio, compared with other schemes.

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SOS: Socially omitting selfishness in IoT for smart and connected communities

Rehman

Ghani

Zubair³

et al. 2020

Int J Communication

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Smart and connected communities (SCC) is an emerging field of internet of things (IoT), and it has potential applications to improve human life. The improvement may be in terms of preservation, revitalization, livability, and sustainability of a community. The resources of the nodes and devices in the SCC have certain constraints that may not allow the devices and nodes to cooperate to save their resources such as memory, energy, and buffer, or simply maximize their performance. Thus, to stimulate the nodes to avoid selfish behavior, SSC needs a novel and well-organized solution to motivate nodes for cooperation. This article aims to resolve the issue of selfish behaviors in SCC and to encourage the nodes for cooperation. A novel mechanism, socially omitting selfishness (SOS), has been proposed to manage/eradicate selfishness using a socially oriented election process. The election process elects different heads based on weight and cooperation (using Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves model). The election of heads and incentive mechanism encourages the nodes to show participation and behave as highly cooperative members of the community. Furthermore, an extended version of the Dempster Shafer model has been used to discourage the selfish behavior of the participating nodes in the SOS scheme. It uses different monitoring and gateway nodes to efficiently employ the proposed scheme. A mathematical model has been developed for the aforementioned aspects and simulated through NS2 simulation environment to analyze the performance of SOS. The results of the proposed scheme outperform the contemporary schemes in terms of average delivery delay, packet delivery ratio, throughput, and average energy.

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Barter trade improves message delivery in opportunistic networks

Cited by 91 publications

References 14 publications

An investigation on the unwillingness of nodes to participate in mobile delay tolerant network routing

An investigation on the unwillingness of nodes to participate in mobile delay tolerant network routing

A Credit-Based Congestion-Aware Incentive Scheme for DTNs

SOS: Socially omitting selfishness in IoT for smart and connected communities

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