2008
DOI: 10.1038/nm1008-996b
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Barriers set up to protect genome databases

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The risk of privacy breaches is increased relative to non-biobank studies, because of the long-term storage of biological materials and information, and the rationale of biobanks to facilitate health research by sharing resources with as many researchers as possible. Attempts to anonymise data in genomic biobanks, in particular, are hampered by the fact that DNA is a unique identifier of individuals (Bjorn 2008;Lowrance and Collins 2007) and even methods that only allow for aggregated anonymized information to be made available to researchers must allow for the fact that computational advances may always show existing safeguards to be insufficient (e.g., Homer et al 2008). …”
Section: Privacymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The risk of privacy breaches is increased relative to non-biobank studies, because of the long-term storage of biological materials and information, and the rationale of biobanks to facilitate health research by sharing resources with as many researchers as possible. Attempts to anonymise data in genomic biobanks, in particular, are hampered by the fact that DNA is a unique identifier of individuals (Bjorn 2008;Lowrance and Collins 2007) and even methods that only allow for aggregated anonymized information to be made available to researchers must allow for the fact that computational advances may always show existing safeguards to be insufficient (e.g., Homer et al 2008). …”
Section: Privacymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sharing of samples and data across national boundaries means that security measures implemented to protect participants in the source jurisdiction may not be enforceable in other jurisdictions. As DNA is by its very nature a unique identifier of individuals, cohorts involved in genomic studies face the challenge that even aggregation of donors' data is no longer sufficient to protect against the identification of an individual's participation in a given study [19][20][21]. Traditional informed consent protocols cannot be applied in many cases as re-consenting participants for different studies may not be possible or financially prohibitive, and no consensus has yet emerged as to ethically acceptable alternatives.…”
Section: Balancing Data Sharing and Privacy Of Genomic And Epidemiolomentioning
confidence: 99%