Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims

Abstract

This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.

A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems

“…Theorem 3 (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992;Albizuri et al 2020) The proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying Pareto optimality, scale covariance, symmetry, and monotonicity.…”