Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control

Albert, Ching‐to; MANOVEl, Michael

doi:10.2307/2951644

Cited by 79 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…To hedge against this risk, they may have incentives to place orders somewhat before the very end of the period. This is reminiscent of the experimental and theoretical analysis of the impact of deadline effects and the risk of communication breakdown on bargaining strategies by Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker (1988) and Ma and Manove (1993). By using field data, we attempt to shed light on these effects in actual markets.…”

Section: B the Learning Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse

Biais

Hillion

Spatt

1999

Journal of Political Economy

313

251

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Section: B the Learning Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse

Biais

Hillion

Spatt

1999

Journal of Political Economy

313

251

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“…We follow the approach of Ma and Manove (1993), who through an iterative process find increasingly tight upper and lower bounds on players' expected SPE payoffs in their game, and subsequently show that in the limit these bounds coincide. In contrast, Ambrus and Lu construct for each player two SPE-one yielding the supremum, the other the infimum of that player's expected SPE payoff-and use this to set up 2n equations with supremum and infimum SPE expected payoffs as the 2n unknowns; solving these equations, they find that these suprema and infima coincide, and are as specified in the theorem.…”

Section: E (λ+R )T When She Is the Proposer At Time T And (λ I /(λ +mentioning

confidence: 99%

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution

2017

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This paper provides a non-cooperative foundation for (asymmetric generalizations of) the continuous Raiffa solution. Specifically, we consider a continuous-time variation of the classic Ståhl-Rubinstein bargaining model, in which there is a finite deadline that ends the negotiations, and in which each player's opportunity to make proposals is governed by a player-specific Poisson process, in that the rejecter of a proposal becomes proposer at the first next arrival of her process. Under the assumption that future payoffs are not discounted, it is shown that the expected payoffs players realize in subgame perfect equilibrium converge to the continuous Raiffa solution outcome as the deadline tends to infinity. The weights reflecting the asymmetries among the players correspond to the Poisson arrival rates of their respective proposal processes.

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“…In some settings, the possible explanation of the "11th hour effect" appears straightforward. When the profit to be divided does not decrease over time, the outcome predicted by game theory is determined by the anticipated behaviour of players in the last period: the last proposer may hope to ripe (almost) all the benefits by making an ultimatum offer (Ma and Manove, 1993). Starting from the final round of the game and working back to the first period reveals that the subgame perfect equilibrium gives virtually all the pie to the last proposer.…”

Section: The Negotiation Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Carraro¹,

Sgobbi²

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process -asymmetries and uncertainties in particular -by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players' optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players' strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players' behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing. Terms of use: Documents in

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Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control

Cited by 79 publications

References 11 publications

Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse

Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

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