Bargaining over the Caspian Sea — The Largest Lake on the Earth

Sheikhmohammady, Majid; Madani, Kaveh

doi:10.1061/40976(316)262

Cited by 39 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…For such a problem FB methods can be applied to predict plausible outcome(s) (Sheikhmohammady and Madani 2008). However, to develop a compromise, they have to fall back in lockstep to a less preferred alternative until alternative with sufficient support is reached (Brams and Kilgour 2001).…”

Section: Deterministic Fallback Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The alternative(s) selected under UFB is at least average in each bargainer's ranking order (Brams and Kilgour 2001). The compromise set under the UFB method exactly includes the alternatives which maximizes the minimum satisfaction over all bargainers (Brams and Kilgour 2001;Sheikhmohammady and Madani 2008). The number of supporters for the water export alternatives in the Delta problem is presented in Table 11.2.…”

Section: Unanimity Fallback Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Beside the other alternatives to agree upon, a new alternative to the bargainers is presented with the permission to impasse (IMP). In a situation in which the bargainer prefers "no agreement" over an alternative, IMP may be chosen, and it is considered as an arbitrary point below which a bargainer would not descend (Brams and Kilgour 2001;Sheikhmohammady and Madani 2008). Therefore, when a bargainer realizes that descending from some alternative is not beneficial, IMP or no agreement may be selected.…”

Section: Fallback Bargaining With Impassementioning

confidence: 99%

“…FB methods can be used as a practical and useful method to simulate the decision making process involving multiple decision makers (Sheikhmohammady and Madani 2008). As game-theoretic methods, these methods help developing a reliable understanding and interpretation of stakeholders' behaviors in multi-decisionmaker hydro-environmental management problems which usually involve conflicts (Madani 2010(Madani , 2013.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conflict Resolution in Water Resources and Environmental Management

Hipel¹,

Fang²,

Cullmann³

et al. 2015

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Section: Deterministic Fallback Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Unanimity Fallback Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fallback Bargaining With Impassementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conflict Resolution in Water Resources and Environmental Management

Hipel¹,

Fang²,

Cullmann³

et al. 2015

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“…Madani and Hipel [11] used the Graph Model for Conflict resolution to provide insight into Jordan River Basin conflict between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel. Sheikhmohammady and Madani [12,13] used fallback bargaining, social choice rules, bankruptcy procedures, and descriptive modeling techniques for providing the most likely outcomes of the Caspian Sea dispute among Azerbajian, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Elimam et al [14] studied the non-cooperative behaviour of the decision makers involved in the Nile river conflict and determined the most likely outcomes of the conflict using the Graph model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Graph Model Conflict Resolution Approach for Jordan River Basin Dispute

Al-Juaidi

Hegazy

2017

BJAST

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This paper aims to establish a practical conflict resolution mechanism and applies it to solve the strategic long-term dispute for Jordan River Basin. The paper starts with a brief history of the Jordan River Basin dispute. The paper then presents a game theoretic approach based on the Graph Model technique for conflict resolution, to investigate the Jordan River Basin dispute, considering the complex socio-political aspects involved. The proposed model of defines the courses of actions available to all the involved stakeholders along with their preferences among them. Accordingly, the model applies stability and sensitivity analyses to propose an optimum resolution to the conflict and to examine the sensitivity of such resolution to the uncertainty in stakeholders' preferences. In this study, three scenarios were investigated with different coalition possibilities among different countries, as follow: (i) Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan; (ii) Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine; and (iii) Jordan, Israel, and Palestine. The results suggest that the best resolution for all parties is through combined water and peace treaties. The results also indicate that a peace treaty between Israel and Palestine is the best resolution to the conflicts. The application of the Graph model in this paper shows its practicality and ability to provide each decision maker with a simulation environment to examine the actions and counteractions that take place during the negotiation among the different parties.

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