Banks and Corporate Lending: An Analysis of the Impact of the Internal Structure of the Capitalist Class on The Lending Behavior of Banks

Do Golden Parachutes increase CEO’s DESIRE to be taken over? empirical evidence from australia and united states

“…A higher cash balance helps to offset the costs of acquisition, thus increasing the likelihood of a takeover and likelihood of a CEO getting paid out. This explanation is consistent with view provided by Jensen (1986) that managers are predominantly self-seekers or it is a reward for social status (Domhoff, 1978;Ratcliff, 1980). Second view is that firms with greater cash balances are more likely to offer large change in control payouts because they have the cash balances to do so.…”

“…Therefore, findings reported by Whisler (1984), Drucker (1974), Lorsch (1989), Larcker and Lambert (1985) and Wade and O'Reilly (1990) provide support to the view that CEOs who have more power on their firm have a higher tendency to use this power to ensure their financial future is secured through the use of golden parachutes. Furthermore, Domhoff (1978) and Ratcliff (1980) argue that golden parachutes are a pat on the back from the board of directors to the CEOs who are the members of the same social class. Such activities are often reported in the popular media and are referred to as corporate back scratching.…”

Acting globally but thinking locally? The enduring influence of local communities on organizations

“…In Atlanta, Hunter (1953) found that well-connected business elites were able to extract preferential treatment from the local government. In St. Louis, banks whose boards were staffed with local business leaders emphasized corporate lending over mortgages, indicating a decrease in local investment in St. Louis (Ratcliff, 1980). In a study of the stability of the French financial elite, Kadushin (1995) shows that local elite connections were durable and were more influential to financial-industry structure than governmental policies.…”

Corporate elites and intercorporate networks

“…This point, central to an understanding of interlock networks, has been made by numerous researchers in various ways. Ratcliff's (1980) Scott's (1986) comparative study of corporate shareholding and financial power in the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan showed that in the mid-1970s most large corporations were not controlled by single interests but were "tied through interweaving share participations into a system of impersonal possession" (p. 200). However, the precise shape of these systems varied between the Anglo-American pattern of financial hegemony and the Japanese structure of aligned participation in corporate sets (on the latter, see Scott 1997: 181-95).…”