Bankruptcy to Surplus: Sharing Transboundary River Basin’s Water under Scarcity

Degefu, Dagmawi Mulugeta; He, Weijun; Yuan, Liang; An, Malaviya; Zhang, Qi

doi:10.1007/s11269-018-1955-z

Cited by 18 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Bankruptcy allocation rules were applied also to the water sector by, for example, Madani and Dinar 2013;Mianabadi et al 2014;Madani et al 2014;Degefu and He 2016;Degefu et al 2018;and Shenlin et al 2020. The objective was to improve groundwater or reservoir management under overexploitation, or to sustain management of shared international waters with claims that exceed the flow.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Welfare Implications of Bankruptcy Allocation of the Colorado River Water: The Case of the Salton Sea Region

Rightnar

Dinar

2020

Water Resour Manage

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Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Nature B.V.. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self-archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Welfare Implications of Bankruptcy Allocation of the Colorado River Water: The Case of the Salton Sea Region

Rightnar

Dinar

2020

Water Resour Manage

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“…(Bozorg-Haddad, Athari, Fallah-Mehdipour, & Loáiciga, 2018) used bankruptcy theory for water allocation in Iran. (Degefu, He, Yuan, Min, & Zhang, 2018) applied the cooperative game theory allocation by combining the Nash bargaining theory and bankruptcy games for the water allocation among Syria, Iraq and Turkey. In this research, the Shapely value and two new water allocation rules are proposed along with the bankruptcy rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Use of bankruptcy methods for resolving interprovincial water conflicts over transboundary river: Case study of Indus River in Pakistan

Janjua

Hassan

2020

River Research & Apps

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Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self‐enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. A pervasive and critical problem related to many transboundary rivers is that the total allocation or demand of riparian states is usually much more than that of the total available water. This problem is a major cause of disputes, both nationally and internationally. A key challenge concerns how to allocate the available water among riparian states with competing and often conflicting needs under an uncertain supply–demand gap. To address this pervasive allocation problem related to transboundary rivers, the bankruptcy method is used. The bankruptcy method distributes water among riparian states when their total demand exceeds the total available water. We investigate the utility of this method in the Indus River – a river that is shared among the four provinces of Pakistan, namely, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) – using five commonly used bankruptcy rules and the Shapely value. Two new bankruptcy rules namely the “groundwater‐based rule” and “the proposed rule” are also proposed to address the usage of groundwater: the land affected by salinity and the gross domestic product (GDP) of each province. Additionally, this paper introduces a new method to compare and contrast the bankruptcy rules, the Shapely value and the two proposed rules. The findings suggest that the groundwater‐based rule has the lowest dispersion and is the preferred method for water allocation in the Indus River Basin. The use of the bankruptcy rules, the Shapely value and the two proposed methods has the potential to address the supply–demand mismatches of shared rivers. The proposed framework for selecting the best rule is recommended as an effective tool to facilitate negotiation over practical water allocation within transboundary river basins.

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“…With economic development, increasing population, and climate change, the competition for water is becoming more and more intense [1][2][3][4]. These contests are fiercer when water resources are internationally shared [5]. However, universally-accepted international agreements and mechanisms to allocate the water capital of these river basins are yet to exist [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allocating Water in the Mekong River Basin during the Dry Season

Yuan

Liao

et al. 2019

Water

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With population numbers increasing and anthropogenic climate change, the amount of available fresh water is declining. This scenario can lead to an increase in the occurrence of water conflicts, especially in transboundary river basins. Prevention strategies to avert water conflicts by designing a fair, efficient, and sustainable water allocation framework are needed. Taking into account the socioeconomic and environmental differences among the riparian countries is one of the most important features an allocation scheme should have. In this article, bankruptcy and bargaining games were used to construct a new weighted water allocation model. The proposed method was applied to allocate the contested water capital of the Mekong River during the dry season. The Mekong River originates in China and flows through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The results of the allocation showed that, except for China and Vietnam, all the other riparian countries get their full claim of the water demand from the river. The water allocation payoffs satisfy individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and maximization of the group utility. Therefore, the allocation outputs from the proposed scheme are self-enforceable and sustainable.

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Bankruptcy to Surplus: Sharing Transboundary River Basin’s Water under Scarcity

Cited by 18 publications

References 20 publications

The Welfare Implications of Bankruptcy Allocation of the Colorado River Water: The Case of the Salton Sea Region

The Welfare Implications of Bankruptcy Allocation of the Colorado River Water: The Case of the Salton Sea Region

Use of bankruptcy methods for resolving interprovincial water conflicts over transboundary river: Case study of Indus River in Pakistan

Allocating Water in the Mekong River Basin during the Dry Season

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