Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process

Abstract

Both ideology and interest group interventions are important in voting on bankruptcy legislation. Roughly 15 votes in the House appear to have been changed directly through interest group pressures proxied by campaign contributions. Many more could have been changed if resources could be fully devoted to spot purchases, but most contributions appear to have been aimed at maintaining legislation on the agenda. In the Senate, state interests on homestead exemptions influenced voting. Although committee markups demonstrate an ideological lineup that is not distinct from floor voting, committees promote bargaining on destabilizing issues.

The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion

“…For example, the Bush administration opposed that 2005 bill because it "fail[ed] to include key elements that are essential to protect the safety and soundness of the housing …nance system ...". 34 In other words, the administration viewed the 2005 legislation as being weak on regulation of GSEs.…”

“…A similar patter, although more nuanced is present in Amendment 600 of the 2005 bill (columns (7) and (8)). As mentioned in section 2, Amendment 600 aimed to limit the systemic risk role of the GSEs'portfolios by allowing the regulator to require disposition of 34 See the statement of administration policy available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24851 speci…c assets or liabilities. Politicians with ties to both special interests and constituent interests (i.e.…”

Do legal origins matter? The case of bankruptcy laws in Europe 1808-1914

“…A classic example is the conflict on bankruptcy reform and land exemption which opposed the rural West to the financial centres of the North-East. In this perspective, Howard Rosenthal and his colleagues have provided new insights into the political economic determinants of bankruptcy reforms in the United States (Berglöf and Rosenthal 2000and 2004, Nunez and Rosenthal 2002, Berglöf, Rosenthal and von Thadden 2001 which also extend to some European experiences; also Domowitz and Tamer 1997). This approach has been extended by David Skeel (2001) to twentieth century trends, with an often close analytical language.…”

“…On the other hand, no indication has been found of widespread land exemptions, as was (is) often the case in the United States; see Warren (1935), Posner E. (1978). Universal moratoria, another common US practice at the time (Alston 1984, Bolton andRosenthal 2002) is also unknown in Europe. 15 This incentive varied within a (5-10%), (5-8,3%) and (5-10% ) bracket respectively.…”

Energy Regulation, Roll Call Votes and Regional Resources: Evidence from Russia

“…As Nunez and Rosenthal (2004) indicate in their study on the impact of private interests and ideology on bankruptcy roll calls, the fear of retaliation in the form of campaign financial cuts motivated the legislators to support bankruptcy law bills, which boosted the financial interests of businessmen. Procreditor voting implies the strong presence of deputies financed by private interests that benefit from it.…”