Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources: The Northern European Anglerfish Fishery

Gallastegui, M. Carmen; Iñarra, Elena; Prellezo, Raúl

doi:10.1086/mre.17.4.42629371

Cited by 26 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…The Shapley Value for bankruptcy games can be computed according to the following procedure (Gallastegui et al 2002). Lining up the agents in some random order, start with the first agent and give each agent his entire claim until total assets E are exhausted.…”

Section: Shapley Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lining up the agents in some random order, start with the first agent and give each agent his entire claim until total assets E are exhausted. All orders are equally likely, and the Shapley Value allocates the average payment over all possible orders to each country (Gallastegui et al 2002). Table 3 illustrates and gives the resulting water allocation solution using the Shapley Value method.…”

Section: Shapley Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the proportional rule (PRO), there are some classical bankruptcy rules such as constrained equal awards (CEA), constrained equal losses (CEL), the Talmud rule (TAL), constrained egalitarian (CE), Adjust Proportional (AP), and Random arrival (RA) rule. PRO rule was already a favored rule of distribution among philosophers of ancient Greece, and even now is widely used in reallocation problems; for instance, it seems to be the principal rule behind the EU distribution of fishing Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and the Common European Fisheries Policy (Gallastegui et al 2002). A comparative analysis of four classical solutions (PRO, CEA, CEL, and TAL) from an axiomatic viewpoint was provided in Herrero and Villar (2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Xia and Cui (2009) also propose a water resource allocation mechanism encouraging improvement of water use efficiency and productivity based on an incentive mechanism combining of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) theory and Talmud rule as well as elimination mechanism. Gallastegui et al (2002) applied bankruptcy theory to the distribution of a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) among the different countries exploiting the Northern European anglerfish fishery.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Mianabadi

Mostert

Pande

et al. 2015

Water Resour Manage

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One significant problem of transboundary river basins causing various challenges and disputes throughout the world is that because of increasing water resource variability and consumption, the water demand often exceeds water availability. Hence, one of the main challenges in transboundary river basin management is how to allocate the available water among the riparian states equitably and reasonably. In this study, we propose a novel weighted bankruptcy solution method to cope with the problem of demands or Bclaims^exceeding resources or Bassets^. Certain desirable key properties of the proposed method are provided. Furthermore, we investigate its application to the Tigris River, a shared river among Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as a real case. The available water is allocated under two different situations: homogeneous and heterogeneous group. We use the Shapley Value and compare the solution with other allocation methods applied in this study. The results suggest that this new rule may facilitate negotiation in solving conflict over the allocation of water in transboundary river basins.

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Section: Shapley Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Shapley Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Mianabadi

Mostert

Pande

et al. 2015

Water Resour Manage

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“…For the first issue, that is, the impacts of different distribution of mitigation efforts between ETS and non-ETS sectors, the following four different effort sharing distributions are considered: Gallastegui et al 2002). For the second issue, the paper explores the possibility of not taxing CO 2 emissions directly but rather taxing actions close to emissions because of the diffuse, shifting nature of many sources and sectors (services, residential, transport).…”

Section: Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost effectiveness of a combination of instruments for global warming: a quantitative approach for Spain

Gallastegui

González-Eguino

Galarraga

2011

SERIEs

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Climate change is an important environmental problem and one whose economic implications are many and varied. This paper starts with the presumption that mitigation of greenhouse gases is a necessary policy that has to be designed in a cost effective way. It is well known that market instruments are the best option for cost effectiveness. But the discussion regarding which of the various market instruments should be used, how they may interact and what combinations of policies should be implemented is still open and very lively. In this paper we propose a combination of instruments: the marketable emission permits already in place in Europe for major economic sectors and a CO 2 tax for economic sectors not included in the emissions permit scheme. The study uses an applied general equilibrium model for the Spanish economy to compute the results obtained with the new mix of instruments proposed. As the combination of the market for emission permits and the CO 2 tax admits different possibilities that depend on how the mitigation is distributed among the economic sectors, we concentrate on four possibilities: cost-effective, equalitarian, proportional to emissions, and proportional to output distributions. Other alternatives to the CO 2 tax are also analysed (tax on energy, on oil and on electricity). Our findings suggest that careful, well designed policies are needed as any deviation imposes significant additional costs that increase more than proportionally to the level of emissions reduction targeted by the EU.

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Multi-issue bankruptcy problems with crossed claims

2021

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In this paper, we introduce a novel model of multi-issue bankruptcy problem inspired from a real problem of abatement of emissions of different pollutants in which pollutants can have more than one effect on atmosphere. In our model, therefore, several perfectly divisible goods (estates) have to be allocated among certain set of agents (claimants) that have exactly one claim which is used in all estates simultaneously. In other words, unlike of the multi-issue bankruptcy problems already existent in the literature, this model study situations with multi-dimensional states, one for each issue and where each agent claims the same to the different issues in which participates. In this context, we present an allocation rule that generalizes the well-known constrained equal awards rule from a procedure derived from analyzing this rule for classical bankruptcy problems as the solution to a sucession of linear programming problems. Next, we carry out an study of its main properties, and we characterize it using the well-known property of consistency.

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Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources: The Northern European Anglerfish Fishery

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Cost effectiveness of a combination of instruments for global warming: a quantitative approach for Spain

Multi-issue bankruptcy problems with crossed claims

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