Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They Are Worth, and Why They Are (Still) There*

Dittmann, Ingolf; Maug, Ernst; Schneider, Christoph

doi:10.1093/rof/rfp007

Cited by 199 publications

(129 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009) indicate that the board and ownership structure is related to the proportion of bankers on French boards. Finally, Dittmann et al (2010) show that bankers are negatively related to firm value in non-financial corporations in Germany. Furthermore, they detect that bankers do not perform a monitoring role neither in their own inter-est as debtholders nor as shareholders.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 88%

Director Characteristics and Firm Performance

Gantenbein

Volonté

2011

SSRN Journal

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 88%

Director Characteristics and Firm Performance

Gantenbein

Volonté

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…Germany is traditionally classified as a codelaw country with weak investor protection and high benefits of private information (LaPorta et al, 1999 and. Furthermore, the German capital market is characterized by the 6 following stylized factors: (i) stronger insider involvement ; (ii) financing structures relying on bank and internal financing (Gorton and Schmid, 2000;Dittmann et al, 2009); (iii) less developed markets for corporate control (Wenger/Kaserer, 1998;Köke, 2004); (iv) more conservative accounting systems (i.e. Daske et al, 2008); and (v) less pronounced enforcement of accounting standards (Hope, 2003).…”

Section: Financial Reporting Under the German Institutional Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Financial Reporting Standards and Earnings Quality: The Myth of Voluntary vs. Mandatory Adoption

et al. 2009

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We revisit evidence whether incentives or IFRS drive earnings quality changes, analyzing a large sample of German firms in the period from 1998 to 2008. Consistent with previous studies we find that voluntary and mandatory adopters differ distinctively in terms of essential firm characteristics and that size, leverage, age, bank ownership and ownership concentration influenced the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS. However, regardless of the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS, we find that conditional conservatism increased under IFRS for both groups of adopters, while evidence does not suggest an increase in value relevance under IFRS. Results on earnings management in the post-adoption period are mixed. While income smoothing decreases for voluntary but not for mandatory adopters, discretionary accruals only decrease for mandatory but not for voluntary adopters. However, further analyses suggest that the capital market environment and the economic cycle during the adoption period seem to be a more powerful explanation for this evidence than voluntary or mandatory IFRS adoption. Therefore, we conclude that incentives to voluntarily adopt IFRS did not unambiguously dominate accounting standards in determining earnings quality in the case of German firms. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: G14, M41, M43, M44, M47

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“…According to Carcello et al (2002) and Cohen and Hanno (2000), the higher the independence of the board of directors, the higher is the amount paid for auditing process. On the other hand, Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2008) provide evidence that there is not a correlation between the auditing remuneration and the independence of the board of directors. The results are also mixt when the characteristics of the board of directors are analyzed.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 86%