1999
DOI: 10.2307/3110113
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Bank Supervision and the Limits of Political Influence over Bureaucracy

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…While investigating one particular agency, Kaufman sought to answer the broader question of how a geographically diverse agency could manage to keep far‐flung administrators uniformly supportive of agency goals and directives. Kaufman’s lessons have been used to shed light on administrative behavior in numerous agencies, largely at the national level (e.g., Gormley 1992; Kunioka and Woller 1999; McCurdy 1992; Scholz and Wood 1998; Whitford 2002). Kaufman’s work has also provided an important baseline for a number of studies focusing on the Forest Service, charting that agency’s growth and change over time.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While investigating one particular agency, Kaufman sought to answer the broader question of how a geographically diverse agency could manage to keep far‐flung administrators uniformly supportive of agency goals and directives. Kaufman’s lessons have been used to shed light on administrative behavior in numerous agencies, largely at the national level (e.g., Gormley 1992; Kunioka and Woller 1999; McCurdy 1992; Scholz and Wood 1998; Whitford 2002). Kaufman’s work has also provided an important baseline for a number of studies focusing on the Forest Service, charting that agency’s growth and change over time.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to be accepted, alterations in the rigidly arranged hierarchy between operational means and ends require evidence that is presented in terms that cohere with the IO's language of expertise. This language of expertise restricts the capacity of non-expert external actors to engage with the IO, to the extent that it can act as an almost impervious -albeit generally unintentional -insulating layer (Kunioka andWoller 1999: 309-10, Adler andBernstein 2005: 304). The IMF is credited with being an archetypal example of such an expertise-based IO (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 50); as such, dynamics on the inside take more of a front seat in shaping the patterns of stakeholder control surrounding its operations.…”
Section: The Exclusionary Power Of Expertise At the Imfmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…At the most informal level, there is evidence, for example, that U.S. state-level politicians have gained considerable leverage over federal agencies even though they have no formal authority over these agencies (Hedge, Scicchitano, and Metz 1991;Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991;Wood 1992). In an analysis, therefore, it is useful to consider the degree to which isolating institutional structures are circumvented (for illustrative examples, see Kunioka and Woller 1999). Thus, in order to assess accurately the level of political influence and control, agency managers must normally consider both the formal institutional ownership structure and the permeability of isolating mechanisms.…”
Section: Public Agency External Analysis 81mentioning
confidence: 98%