Ballistic missile security risks facing Japan

Yamamoto, Atsumasa

doi:10.1080/13439009508719905

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…(So the Japanese expert Atsumasa Yamamoto in an analysis published in 1995) 219 Until the end of the Cold War, Japan's foreign and security policy was based on the three well-known non-nuclear principles. But they were promulgated as part of the government's less well-known four nuclear principles.…”

Section:   123mentioning

confidence: 99%

Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-Operation—A View from Europe

Umbach¹

2000

Comprehensive Security in Asia

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U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a still classified new directive for the American nuclear forces that defines the potential use of nuclear weapons in conflict situations. The new directive marks a departure from a nuclear strategy developed in 1981 under former U.S. President Ronald Reagan that called to fight an all-out, protracted nuclear war until victory, irrespective of social and military costs. According to the new guidelines, the future main purpose of U.S. nuclear forces will put the emphasis on deterring the use of nuclear arms or other mass destruction weapons against U.S. forces or allies by threatening a devastating response. These changes in the U.S. nuclear strategy have become necessary because the future nuclear defence planning and targeting requirements have to be reconciled with the denuclearization cuts of START-I and -II. Furthermore, these changes should encourage the ratification of START-II (which calls for reductions of nuclear warheads from 6.000 to 3.000-3.500 on both sides) in the Russian Duma. 1 Nonetheless, the Clinton directive will preserve an retaliation option of using nuclear strikes against military and civilian targets, if U.S. and allied armed forces are attacked particularly with chemical or biological weapons. Therefore, the United States will retain a triad of nuclear forces consisting of bombers, land-based missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-based missiles (SLBMs) but on lower levels according to proposals of future START-III negotiations with * Frank Umbach is a Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP) in Berlin. This analysis is based on findings of a research project "Perspectives of Regional Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region", sponsored by the Volkswagen foundation, at the DGAP.1 To ambivalent Russian reactions see Dmitrii Gornostaev,

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Section:   123mentioning

confidence: 99%

Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-Operation—A View from Europe

Umbach¹

2000

Comprehensive Security in Asia

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“…Il n'a aucun moyen de repérer les départs de tir et, à l'arrivée, l'efficacité de ses Patriot est aléatoire contre des engins rapides. Même l'aviation américaine ne pourrait pas réduire au silence les lanceurs chinois [33]. Seul un système complet de missiles antimissiles de théâtre parerait la menace.…”

Section: Le Développement éConomique De La Chine : Opportunité Ou Menunclassified

Le Japon et la Chine : amour, haine et géostratégie

Bouissou¹

1996

polit

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Japan and China : Love, Hatred, and Geo-Strategy, by Jean-Marie Bouissou Sino-Japanese relations bear the imprint of eighteen centuries of ambiguity, and the trauma of a devastating war. This impassioned context puis Tokyo on the defensive. In any hypothesis, China's development constitutes a threat to Japan, which stands by helpless. Likewise, Japan's options are few compared with China's military might. A patient three-pronged strategy (some form of containment , tying China into multilateral networks, and confidence-building) seems the most appropriate over time. But the time factor may turn out to be crucial, given the volatility of the situation in China. Résumé Dix-huit siècles de rapports ambigus et le traumatisme d'une guerre dévastatrice ont marqué les relations sino-japonaises, dont le contexte passionnel place Tokyo sur la défensive. Le développement de la Chine, dans toutes les hypothèses, constitue une menace pour le Japon, qui n'a guère de prise sur cette évolution. De même, il est assez désarmé face aux diverses options militaires dont la Chine dispose. Une stratégie patiente à trois axes-esquisser un containment, prendre Pékin dans le filet des organisations internationales et bâtir la confiance-semble la plus appropriée à terme. Mais le facteur temps peut s'avérer crucial, compte tenu de la volatilité de la situation en Chine.

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Ballistic missile security risks facing Japan

Cited by 2 publications

References 3 publications

Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-Operation—A View from Europe

Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-Operation—A View from Europe

Le Japon et la Chine : amour, haine et géostratégie

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