Bald‐faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive

Sorensen, Roy

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00290.x

Cited by 167 publications

(111 citation statements)

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“…In § 3 argumentiere ich gegen Ansätze wie die von Carson (2010), nach denen dies nicht der Fall ist. § 4 behandelt sogenannte bald-faced lies (Sorensen 2007), die meines Erachtens keinen Fall von Lügen darstellen. Vielmehr handelt es sich um einen speziellen Fall der Beleidigung (Meibauer 2014b).…”

Section: Wechselseitiges Hintergrundwissen Und Kontext: Für Die Verstunclassified

“…Besonders Thomas L. Carson (2010) hat dies bestritten. Andere Forscher vertreten die gleiche oder eine ähnliche Auffassung (Sorensen 2007;Fallis 2009; siehe auch Stokke 2013a). Kritisch wenden sich Mahon (2008), Meibauer (2011) und Lackey (2013 (Carson 2010: 20) Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual committed the crime.…”

Section: Lügen Und Täuschenunclassified

“…Seierstad das annimmt), dass Takhlef die geäußerten Propositionen nicht glaubt. Um Fälle wie (11) erfassen zu können, schlägt Sorensen (2007) einen Ersatz für das Konzept der Täuschungsabsicht vor, nämlich die Unterscheidung zwischen enger und weiter Plausibilität. Unter der Annahme, dass "lying is just asserting what one does not believe" (Sorensen 2007: 266), unterscheidet er 13 Fallis (2015) bezieht sich auf die Klassifikation der Täuschungen nach Chisholm und Feehan (1977), um den Nachweis zu führen, dass der Fall des schummelnden Studenten, auf den sich Lackey (2013) Kenyon 2003).…”

Section: Lügen Und Täuschenunclassified

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Konzepte des Lügens

Meibauer

2015

Zeitschrift Für Sprachwissenschaft

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Although lying is an action which is fundamental for human communication, there are not many analyses that treat lying from a linguistic point of view. This paper treats lying on the background of recent discussions of the semantics-pragmatics interface. On the one hand, lying has to do with truth and falsehood; since these are semantic notions, there is a semantic side of lying. On the other hand, lying has to do with the speech act of assertion, and this is a genuine pragmatic notion. Semantic and pragmatic aspects go into a proper definition of lying as proposed in this paper. On the basis of typical scenarios it is shown how lying may be distinguished from deception and misleading. It is argued that lying is an act of verbal deception; however, deception has not to be implemented into the definition of lying as a separate condition. This line of argument runs against recent approaches in the philosophy of language (cf. Carson 2010) that defend the view that lying does not include deception. Furthermore, at least some cases of misleading in the sense of Saul (2012) may be analysed as cases of untruthful implicatures. The latter are considered as a part of the total act of lying (see Meibauer 2005, Meibauer 2011, Meibauer 2014a, Meibauer 2014b, and Meibauer 2014c. In the course of this paper further acts such as so-called bald-faced lies, selfless assertions, and bullshitting are discussed and related to the overall topic of lying.

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Section: Wechselseitiges Hintergrundwissen Und Kontext: Für Die Verstunclassified

Section: Lügen Und Täuschenunclassified

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Konzepte des Lügens

Meibauer

2015

Zeitschrift Für Sprachwissenschaft

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“…Recently, many instances of lying that involve no intention to deceive have been brought to the attention of the philosophical debate (e.g. Carson 2006;Sorensen 2007;Fallis 2009Fallis , 2010. Consequently, a growing number of authors have disputed the necessity of condition (iii), suggesting that to define lying we should instead narrow condition (i) by requiring that the speaker utter a genuine assertion: 2 Alternative definition: S lies to A about p iff: (i) S asserts p (ii) S believes p to be false Virtually any philosopher endorses either the classic or the alternative definition.…”

Section: ) More Formallymentioning

confidence: 99%

Lying as a scalar phenomenon

Marsili¹

2014

Studies in Language Companion Series

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Every species is vague, every term goes cloudy at its edges, and so in my way of thinking, relentless logic is only another name for stupidity -for a sort of intellectual pigheadedness.H.G. Wells, First and Last Things (1908) In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases -the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies).It puts forward a new definition to deal with these scalar parameters, that requires that the speaker asserts what he believes more likely to be false than true. The second section shows that statements are scalar in the same way beliefs are, and accounts for a further element of scalarity, illocutionary force. The definition of lying and the insincerity conditionA number of philosophers have tried to define lying -i.e. to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to be a lie. According to the "classic" definition, first proposed in St.Augustine's De Mendacio (DM, 3.3) and later developed in several works (e.g. Mannison 1969: 132; Kupfer 1982: 134; Williams 2002: 96), "lying is to make a believed-false statement 1 to another * The author thanks Alberto Voltolini, Matteo Grasso, Carla Bazzanella, Jennifer Saul, Rosanna Keefe, Guido Bonino and Jörg Meibauer for their helpful comments, Igor Ž. Žagar for his support, Nina Black Simone for proofreading, and three anonymous reviewers.

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“…But although lying has been studied extensively in recent philosophy (Carson 2006;Sorensen 2007;Fallis 2009;Saul 2012;Stokke 2013) little or no attention has been paid to other forms of non-alethic speech. A notable exception is Harry Frankfurt's well-known essay On Bullshit (2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth

Fallis¹,

Stokke²

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This paper is about some of the ways in which people sometimes speak while being indifferent toward what they say. We argue that what Harry Frankfurt called 'bullshitting' is a mode of speech marked by indifference toward inquiry, the cooperative project of reaching truth in discourse. On this view bullshitting is characterized by indifference toward the project of advancing inquiry by making progress on specific subinquiries, represented by so-called questions under discussion. This account preserves the central insight of Frankfurt's influential analysis of bullshitting in seeing the characteristic of bullshitting as indifference toward truth and falsity. Yet we show that speaking with indifference toward truth is a wider phenomenon than the one Frankfurt identified. The account offered in this paper thereby agrees with various critics of Frankfurt who argue that bullshitting is compatible with not being indifferent toward the truth-value of one's assertions. Further, we argue that, while bullshitting and lying are not mutually exclusive, most lies are not instances of bullshitting. The account thereby avoids the problem that Frankfurt's view ultimately is insufficient to adequately distinguish bullshitting and lying.

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Bald‐faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive

Cited by 167 publications

References 7 publications

Konzepte des Lügens

Konzepte des Lügens

Lying as a scalar phenomenon

Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth

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