1996
DOI: 10.2307/2600888
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Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System

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Cited by 36 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…2 Others argued that some behavior often associated with balancing is actually something else: states often fight powerful aggressors not because they balance against these aggressors but rather because they are directly attacked (Schroeder, 1994;Rosecrance and Lo, 1996; 2 Vasquez, 1997).…”
Section: Hegemonic Threats and Balancing In Europe 1495-1999mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…2 Others argued that some behavior often associated with balancing is actually something else: states often fight powerful aggressors not because they balance against these aggressors but rather because they are directly attacked (Schroeder, 1994;Rosecrance and Lo, 1996; 2 Vasquez, 1997).…”
Section: Hegemonic Threats and Balancing In Europe 1495-1999mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Scholars also undertook empirical studies of particular cases to see if states balanced against threats (or power) or bandwagoned with them (Labs 1992;Kaufman 1992;Walt 1992). Schroeder (1994) broadened the categories and demonstrated that states often bandwagon, hide, or "transcend" rather than balance (see also Arquilla, 1992), andSchweller (1994) argued that while status quo states balance to preserve their security, revisionist states often bandwagon with the strong in order to secure economic gains and otherwise expand their influence.2 Others argued that some behavior often associated with balancing is actually something else: states often fight powerful aggressors not because they balance against these aggressors but rather because they are directly attacked (Schroeder, 1994;Rosecrance and Lo, 1996; 2 Vasquez, 1997).These new perspectives on balancing have been supported with historical illustrations from the last four centuries and with more detailed historical case studies. While some of these individual studies are convincing, either in support or criticism of the balancing proposition, they do not constitute, individually or collectively, anything approaching a systematic empirical test of the proposition that states systematically balance against hegemonic threats.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to balance of power theory, states engage in balancing internally (economic and military buildup) and ⁄ or externally (alliance or coalition building) in order to accumulate or augment power (Waltz 1979:118). Since the aim of a soft-balancing strategy, on the other hand, is not to alter the share of available capabilities or resources, but rather to curb the emerging power's behavior and deter it from further practicing hostile policies without turning to hard balancing, military buildup or formal alliances are not necessarily the most appropriate remedies (Rosecrance and Lo 1996).…”
Section: Soft Balancing As Foreign Policy Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Defensive realists (Waltz, 1979;Walt, 1987) argue, in contrast, that the most common state behavior is balancing against great-power expansion. Realist critics of the balancing proposition (Powell, 1999;Rosecrance, 2003) argue that collective action problems systematically interfere with efforts at balancing, asserting that in many cases states may find buckpassing or bandwagoning with the expanding power to be the safer course -or the more profitable one (Schweller, 1994). Our findings show that all of these courses of action are commonly followed, often to the point where they become foolish boondoggles.…”
Section: State Behavior: Expansion Balancing Buckpassing Bandwagonmentioning
confidence: 99%