Balance of Power and the Propensity of Conflict

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may www.econstor.euBalance of power and the propensity of con ‡ict February 27, 2015 AbstractWe study the role of an imbalance in …ghting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of con ‡ict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of con ‡ict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of con ‡ict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes re ‡ect the players' unequal …ghting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most e¢ cient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.JEL codes: C78, C91, D72, D74

Prospect Theory, Fairness, and the Escalation of Conflict at a Negotiation Impasse*

“…Our study also relates to the experimental literature on bargaining in the shadow of conflict that examines, among other things, the effect of the asymmetry of conflict on bargaining outcomes (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985;Kimbrough and Shremeta, 2014;Dechenaux et al, 2015;Herbst et al, 2017). Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) find that the negotiation strategies do not react to conflict asymmetries as much as the selfish sequentially rational theory would predict, but that QRE and otherregarding preferences can account for the observed patterns.…”

Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade

“…However, we admittedly recognize that we develop our trade‐conflict model upon some simplifying assumptions. A potentially interesting extension of the model is to see how the conflict‐trade equilibrium in a two‐country framework is affected by strategic interventions of a third country or the possibility of mediation proposals (Herbst, Konrad, and Morath ) . Another possible extension is to see how differences in production technologies affect the trade equilibrium of two resource‐conflict nations and their optimal arming decisions.…”

“…Stressing the role of mediation proposals, Herbst, Konrad, and Morath () analyze how a disparity in fighting strengths between rivals affects the equilibrium outcome of bargaining under the shadow of conflict. The authors show experimentally that the possibility of fighting is not affected by power disparity with an exogenous mediation proposal.…”

Bargaining and conflict with up-front investments: How power asymmetries matter

“…Proposition 2: (i) A unique equilibrium of the Bargaining game exists in which both players participate for all parameter values. The equilibrium payoffs are described in (15).…”

“…Although conflict occurred in the experiments more than predicted by theory, greater asymmetry did not induce more conflict. Kimbrough et al (2014) and Herbst et al (2017) allowed possibly asymmetric probabilities of winning in conflict to be endogenously determined. Kimbrough et al (2014) employed an ex ante random device instead of a bargaining game to resolve conflict and greater asymmetries induced some more conflict but not as much as expected theoretically.…”