Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy: Franco-British Diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht

The Social Sources of Geopolitical Power: French and British Diplomacy and the Politics of Interstate Recognition, 1689 to 1789

“…Finally, it is worth considering what a treaty actually is: the material presence of international law, “commonly taken by lawyers as the primary and most reliable source of international rules and obligations” (Keene 2012:475). Indeed, this was especially true in the eighteenth century, because the lack of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) meant that virtually all international legal precedent was set by state-to-state agreements (see, e.g., Dhondt 2015; Keene 2012). In the eighteenth-century context, a state’s treaty-making activity is a good measure of its contribution to the rules and institutions of interstate politics.…”

“…France dictated the terms of peace, primarily through its negotiations with Austria rather than its military victories. As a result, France gained hegemonic influence in the Holy Roman Empire, secured an inheritance claim to the duchy of Lorraine, and acquired Naples and Sicily for another branch of the Bourbons (Black 1986:33; Dhondt 2015:483, 488; McKay and Scott 1983:149–53).…”

“…Similarly, Britain’s effort to influence constitutional issues in the Holy Roman Empire during the early 1750s alienated both Austria and France, and it may have contributed to their long-term realignment against Britain later that decade (Baugh 1988:45; Black 1986:55–56; McKay and Scott 1983:184). By contrast, France successfully mediated an end to an Austro-Russo-Turkish war in 1739, which further elevated its prestige in central Europe (Dhondt 2015:491; Kennedy 1988:108; McKay and Scott 1983:157). As Frederick the Great could claim as late as the 1740s, France was “the arbiter of Europe” (quoted in McKay and Scott 1983:151).…”

“…In 1720, the British ambassador to Paris, the earl of Stair, offended the French princes with his poor handling of ceremony, violating forms that were “perfectly known and practiced without dispute by all the Ambassadors” according to the French foreign minister (British Library [BL] Stowe MS 247:40). Writing from Paris in 1723, another British diplomat castigated himself as “being an entire stranger to this Court very weak in ye French language and manner of address” (quoted in Dhondt 2015:242). More generally, Chesterfield complained in his letters that his colleagues were ill-equipped to serve as ambassadors because of their poor manners (Kugeler 2006:256–57; Mori 2010:18).…”

“…All of these states occupied branches of the Bourbon dynasty, with France representing the senior branch. Accordingly, the major Franco–Spanish alliances of the eighteenth century—signed in 1721, 1733, 1743, and 1761—were literally “family compacts,” based on private family law, accompanied by marriage treaties, and designed to forward the collective interest of the House of Bourbon (Bély 1999:64; Dhondt 2015:236, 462). Many early modern treaties were broken on a whim, but Spain was France’s most loyal ally in the eighteenth century (López-Cordón Cortezo 2003; Scott 2003).…”