Bad to the bone: essentially bad perceptual experiences

Ivanov, Ivan

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2028672

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…In this respect, RIH is superior to Raleigh's relationalist view of hallucination, according to which the phenomenology of hallucination is constituted by certain appearance properties of the external cause of something of which we are aware (Fish, 2009, Chap. 5;Ivanov 2022). hallucination (Raleigh 2014).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, however, some naïve realists have attempted to argue against Martin's screening off argument (Allen, 2015;Moran, 2019Moran, , 2022Ivanov 2022). They emphasize that the screening off argument relies on the local supervenience principle, which claims that the phenomenology of perfect hallucination supervenes solely on the subject's neural states/activities.…”

Section: The Compatibility Between Naïve Realism and Rih: The Screeni...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, naïve realists should argue that there is a good account of non-veridical experiences that fits coherently with naïve realism. For this reason, many naïve realists have attempted to explain non-veridical experiences (Brewer, 2011;Dokic and Martin 2012;Fish 2009;French, 2014;Genone, 2014;Ivanov, 2022;Kalderon, 2011;Logue 2012bLogue , 2013Martin 2004;.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…There is, however, a specific kind of non-veridical experience that supposedly poses an explanatory difficulty to naïve realism, namely total and neurally matching 1 I owe this formulation of naïve realism to Soteriou (2016, 83). The following figures can be counted as naïve realists: Allen (2019); Beck (2019aBeck ( , 2019b, Brewer (2011Brewer ( , 2017, Campbell (2002), French and Gomes (2019), Fish (2009), Ivanov (2022), Kennedy (2009Kennedy ( , 2013Logue (2012a), Martin (2002Martin ( , 2004, Moran (2019Moran ( , 2022 and Niikawa (2021). It is natural, though controversial, to interpret Johnston (2004Johnston ( , 2006 as a naïve realist.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination

Niikawa

2023

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Naïve realists hold that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is in part constituted by environmental objects that the subject is perceiving. Although naïve realism is well-motivated by considering the cognitive and epistemic roles of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience, it is considered difficult to explain hallucinatory and imaginative experiences. This paper provides three arguments to address these explanatory problems systematically on behalf of naïve realism. First, I argue that the imagination view of hallucination (IH), which states that hallucinations are involuntary sensory imagination, can be applied to total and neutrally matching hallucinations. Second, I argue for the conjunction of IH and the representational view of imagination (RI), according to which sensory imagination (including hallucination) is representational (shortly RIH). Third, I argue that naïve realism can coherently be integrated with RIH. I finally present an integrative model of perception, imagination and hallucination from the perspective of the combination of naïve realism and RIH.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Compatibility Between Naïve Realism and Rih: The Screeni...mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination

Niikawa

2023

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…First, there is something quite intuitive about perfect hallucinatory experiences being perceptual states (see Ivanov 2022). Moreover, as we saw, Otherist accounts of perceptual states are not effective in addressing SP, so Perceptual Anomalism has turned out to be the best response to IP.…”

Section: Disjunctive Perceptual Anomalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The integration problem for naive realism

Ivanov

2023

Metaphilosophy

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This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well‐trodden Screening‐off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive‐ realist‐friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing.

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Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination

Moran

2022

Erkenn

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Disjunctivists maintain that perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences are distinct kinds of event with different metaphysical natures. Moreover, given their view about the nature of perceptual cases, disjunctivists must deny that the perceptual kind of experience can occur during hallucination. However, it is widely held that disjunctivists must grant the converse claim, to the effect that the hallucinatory kind of experience occurs even during perception. This paper challenges that thought. As we will see, the argument for thinking that the hallucinatory kind of experience is present even in cases of perception depends on prior acceptance of a ‘non-demanding’ conception of hallucination, on which all it takes to produce an hallucinatory experience is to induce in the subject the right kind of neurological condition. On the view developed here, by contrast, there are substantive causal conditions, going beyond the mere occurrence of the right kind of neurological state, that must be met if an experience of the hallucinatory kind is to occur. By drawing on this view, I argue, disjunctivists can deny that the kind of experience involved in hallucination ever occurs during perception. This then allows disjunctivists to avoid certain important problems they would otherwise face. It also leaves them with considerably more freedom when it comes to theorising about the nature of hallucinatory experience.

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Bad to the bone: essentially bad perceptual experiences

Cited by 4 publications

References 37 publications

Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination

Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination

The integration problem for naive realism

Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination

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