Bad Boundaries: Geofences and the Intimacies of Location Data

Abstract

Locational data are a key part of platform function. They organize people and environments according to position and proximity. One technique through which platforms collect and circulate locational data is through geofences—virtual perimeters established around target locations that mark who and what crosses their thresholds. Applying the lens of data intimacies, the authors look at two applications of geofences in the United States: (a) to target abortion seekers through geofencing brokers like CellHawk that extrapolate and sell Google Maps locational data and (b) to accelerate the tenant eviction process through platforms such as CIVVL, a so-called property preservation platform. Through the examples of CellHawk and CIVVL, this article argues that geofences enable platforms to organize space and make claims on the body via location data. Geofencing is a practice that exploits the intimacy of locational data not simply by accessing private data but also by using intimate data to index the body in relation to risk and safety and property and trespass. Geofencing is a mechanism through which platforms police and patrol space, reifying unequal terms of autonomy and access.