2007
DOI: 10.1177/0032329206297145
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Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization

Abstract: In the 1990s, Bolivia’s indigenous population mobilized to claim new political roles, and in the process, directly challenged the privileged position of economic elites within national political institutions. In response, business associations in Santa Cruz, Bolivia’s most prosperous region, began to demand regional autonomy—in contrast to the demand for authoritarianism that characterized prior generations of business elites when confronted with threatening political change. After examining Santa Cruz’ past r… Show more

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Cited by 75 publications
(65 citation statements)
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“…prior to indigenous leader Evo Morales' electoral victory. Elites had extensive informal ties to the traditional parties that together held a majority in congress (MNR, and MIR, and ADN), and strong encompassing organizations facilitated collective action by business actors (Conaghan and Malloy 1994, Gamarra and Malloy 1995, Eaton 2007. Business associations denounced tax increases, arguing that the large, primarily indigenous informal sector should be incorporated into the tax base instead (interview, CEPB 2006).…”
Section: (C) Argentina's Temporally-limited Success: Tax On Corporatementioning
confidence: 99%
“…prior to indigenous leader Evo Morales' electoral victory. Elites had extensive informal ties to the traditional parties that together held a majority in congress (MNR, and MIR, and ADN), and strong encompassing organizations facilitated collective action by business actors (Conaghan and Malloy 1994, Gamarra and Malloy 1995, Eaton 2007. Business associations denounced tax increases, arguing that the large, primarily indigenous informal sector should be incorporated into the tax base instead (interview, CEPB 2006).…”
Section: (C) Argentina's Temporally-limited Success: Tax On Corporatementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Economic elites who find their positions threatened by ethnic mobilization that advances demands for redistribution and the reordering of political power structures might be more inclined to withdraw their support from the state, reduce their tax payments, and instead focus their efforts on retaining their elite status by establishing private security measures and/or promoting the territorial reorganization of the state. Kent Eaton's (2007Eaton's ( , p. 2011) study of Bolivia and Ecuador provides a particularly stark example of this mechanism variant. In these two countries, characterized by sharp geographical divisions between the centres of economic activity and the political capital, economic elites are greatly concerned about the recent rise of indigenous politics.…”
Section: (B2/b3) Ethnic Mobilization and Alliance Strategies By Sociementioning
confidence: 99%
“…While discursive representations such as these employ a broadened sense of indigenous identity, which articulates particular interests and ideological positions (that of lowland indigenous political acceptance with white elite goals of regional autonomy), they also help solidify regional divides that complicate any attempt to forge broader coalitions between Andean and lowland groups. Though elements of this discourse appeal to lowland indigenous aspirations for territorial and cultural autonomy, they are, at root, part of an ideological project aimed at bolstering the political and economic power of the region's urban, white elites (Eaton 2007; Gustafson 2006Gustafson , 2008.…”
Section: Indigeneity and The Bolivian Statementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to the openings created for indigenous peoples, Morales' election has widened splits between different social sectors, most notably between the lowland east and the highland west. In particular, existing tensions between the urban poles of La Paz and Santa Cruz have been exacerbated by calls from Santa Cruz's elites for departmental autonomy, and the equally vigorous rejection of the autonomista movement by Morales' social movement allies (Eaton 2007; Gustafson 2006Gustafson , 2008. Such regional animosities have fuelled sporadic violence both in Santa Cruz and in the highland west, most recently in relation to the dysfunctional Constitutional Assembly (Spronk 2007).…”
Section: Morales and The New Bolivia: Lessons For Change?mentioning
confidence: 99%