Avoiding the resource curse the case Norway

Holden, Steinar

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.09.010

Cited by 103 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 8 publications

(6 reference statements)

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“…An example of an ad hoc …scal rule with a high degree of …scal conservatism is that of Norway, one of the world largest producers of oil and gas. A concise but detailed presentation of the Norwegian experience with management of its petroleum resources is provided by Holden (2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A comparison of fiscal rules for resource-rich economies

Iacono

2017

Economic Analysis and Policy

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This paper produces a normative evaluation of …scal rules for a resourcerich economy. Ad hoc …scal rules might imply substantial welfare costs; the goal is to analyze the magnitude of these costs by quantitatively evaluating the relative welfare sub-optimality of these rules. I posit a closed form solution for the in…nite horizon consumption problem of the planner of a resource-rich economy with resource price uncertainty and precautionary saving. The model is subsequently calibrated and simulated to provide a welfare-based comparison between the …scal rules based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis and on the ad hoc Bird-in-Hand policy. The results of the simulation indicate the presence of a positive and substantial welfare loss su¤ered from switching to the Bird-inHand rule. This result is shown to be robust under di¤erent parameterizations.JEL classi…cation D9, H3, Q32, Q38.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A comparison of fiscal rules for resource-rich economies

Iacono

2017

Economic Analysis and Policy

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“…Botswana is also heavily dependent on natural resources, but its decades of high economic performance have been remarkable [29]. For most scholars, strong institutions and good governance practices have been offered as key explanatory factors to the high economic growth of these countries [28][29][30]. In fact, Holden captures the Norwegian success as one characterized by not only strong institutions and good governance, but the protection of property rights and high quality public bureaucracy [30].…”

Section: Governance Practices Strong Institutions and The Resource mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of Norway, for example, it is not only one of the largest oil and gas exporting countries in the world, but its economy continues to defy the expectations of the resource curse with a high growth rate [30]. Botswana is also heavily dependent on natural resources, but its decades of high economic performance have been remarkable [29].…”

Section: Governance Practices Strong Institutions and The Resource mentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Institutions, Natural Resource Governance, and Ghana’s Oil Wealth

Kumah-Abiwu

2017

Social Sciences

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Abstract:The literature on natural resources is endowed with works on countries that have experienced slow economic performance despite their abundant natural resources (resource curse), with the exception of Norway and other few countries. Strong institutions and good governance practices have been underscored as some of the explanatory factors to the high performance of the outlier countries. Ghana's oil discovery in the era of its advancing democratic practices has led some to argue that the country might escape the resource curse phenomenon. While recognizing the importance of this argument, this article, however, argues that Ghana's likelihood of escaping the resource curse could be problematic due to its exclusive emphasis on democratic governance without greater focus on oil sector governance. Drawing on the theory of agenda setting and the existing literature, the article makes the case for agenda shift in the debate on Ghana's oil wealth and development. It stresses the need for a dualistic governance (the democratic and the oil sector) approach in the broader discourse on how Ghana can escape the resource curse.

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“…Windfalls gave rise to rentier populism and caused several growth collapses in Venezuela (Mazzuca, 2013), whereas Norway remained a stable democracy. The latter demonstrates that strong institutions lead to sound revenue management policies (Mehrara, 2008;Holden, 2013) which promote diversification and help to prevent the Dutch disease. (Ville and Wicken, 2013) Turning natural wealth into a blessing seems to be a question of public and private institutions alike.…”

Section: Open Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review on the Resource Curse

Szalai

2018

Period. Polytech. Soc. Man. Sci.

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Natural wealth is generally considered as one of the fundamental sources of economic growth. However, a vast majority of the related empirical research verified that resource-rich countries tend to underperform their resource-deficient counterparts. This paradox is known as the resource curse. During the past two decades more sophisticated analyses have revealed that the presence of the curse is conditional and its growth effects are non-monotonic. Recent efforts concentrate on understanding the transmission channels and identifying the decisive conditions on the fulfillment of the curse. This article gives an overview on the progress and depicts the current state of the research.

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Avoiding the resource curse the case Norway

Cited by 103 publications

References 8 publications

A comparison of fiscal rules for resource-rich economies

A comparison of fiscal rules for resource-rich economies

Democratic Institutions, Natural Resource Governance, and Ghana’s Oil Wealth

A Review on the Resource Curse

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