Avicenna’s “Letter on the Disappearance of the Vain Intelligible Forms after Death”

Michot, Julie

doi:10.1484/j.bpm.3.331

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…This is given in two parts, one seen when the agent is awake and the other when they are dreaming. This article along with Yahya Michot (1985), Deborah L. Black (1997) and Jari Kaukua (2007, p.136 ff.) is one of the few written works on medieval Islamic ideas on fictional beings.…”

Section: Sources and Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…In terms of understanding tashkīk, I claim that Ṣadrā's tashkīk is a different version of univocal understanding of being. From this perspective, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi and his Hiram-i Hastī (The Pyramid of Existence) is an important source for his emphasis on the continuity and unbrokenness 18 Michot, 1985, "Avicenna's Letter on the Disappearance of the Vain Intelligible forms after Death", Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, pp. 94-103; Black, "Avicenna on the ontological and epistemological status of fictional beings", Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8, pp.…”

Section: Sources and Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intentionality in Mulla Sadra

Parıldar

2020

Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind

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The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy in the light of Brentano's theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the 'mental' as opposed to the 'natural'.Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that 'there are things that do not exist'. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā's philosophy reflect the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature of intentionality demonstrating an alternative approach to the concepts of existence and the soul.Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence (wujūd ẓillī). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational ontology (tashkīk) that all things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Accordingly intentional objects are a level of existence, and share same reality.Epistemologically, all knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (knowledge) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor immaterial per se: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul's journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the processes of perception. Intentionality is soul's action of creating mental forms. The products are identical to soul since soul and knowledge are identical.Consequently, intentional objects are dependent on the soul in their presence and creation.

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Section: Sources and Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Sources and Previous Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intentionality in Mulla Sadra

Parıldar

2020

Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind

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Avicenna on empty intentionality: a case study in analytical Avicennianism

Zarepour

2022

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

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ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib: The Poetics of a Mythical Creature

Ron-Gilboa

2021

J. Abbasid Stud.

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In early Arabic literature, ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib is the name of the quintessential mythical bird. The ʿAnqāʾ appears in a myriad of medieval sources of different genres: poetical, narrative, proverbial, scientific, philosophical, and mystical. This paper draws attention to the multiple ways in which this bird was represented and the functions it fulfilled in different literary contexts. It explores the intricate web of quotations, allusions, and literary innovations that facilitated its multifarious uses and re-uses. I explore the various manifestations of the ʿAnqāʾ to demonstrate the different and at times contradictory meanings ascribed to it and its diverse literary functions: as a creature of speculative zoology; as metaphor of scarcity or non-existence; as a metaphor of God; as a marker of fictionality; and more.

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Avicenna’s “Letter on the Disappearance of the Vain Intelligible Forms after Death”

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Intentionality in Mulla Sadra

Intentionality in Mulla Sadra

Avicenna on empty intentionality: a case study in analytical Avicennianism

ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib: The Poetics of a Mythical Creature

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