2016
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2882682
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Availability of Better Data on Communication Networks Can Undermine Community Enforcement

Abstract: I consider a repeated trust game played between a group of insiders, arranged in a network representing their lines of communication, and a single outsider. Insiders follow a local punishment rule, shunning the outsider if it has cheated them or a neighbor. The object of interest is that the outsider may know either summary statistics about the nature of the network, or know its precise non-anonymous structure. For the outsider to have knowledge of the precise structure may, depending on the shape of the netwo… Show more

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