Autonomy and Toleration as a Moral Attitude

Abstract

Philosophers have generally understood toleration to include three elements: i. A negative evaluative attitude toward the object of toleration. (Objection) ii. Refraining from or refusing to interfere with the object of toleration.(Allowance) iii. The power or capacity to interfere with the object of toleration. (Power) Call this the standard analysis of toleration.1 One notable feature of the standard analysis is that the allowance condition is quite weak. It is possible to successfully allow an object of toleration merely through inaction. If I am to tolerate something, I must merely withhold from "interfering" with the object of toleration or "preventing" it from occurring or being realized, or "suppressing" it. 2In contrast to the standard analysis, folk use of the concept sometimes implies that toleration cannot always be achieved through meeting an exclusively negative requirement. We can tolerate a friend's nettlesome partner by conversing with courtesy or extending an invitation to lunch. Someone who refuses to vote for a political candidate due to the candidate's religion (or lack of religion) might be accused of intolerance. A family of meat-eaters might show toleration for the values of their vegan dinner guests by taking care to avoid animal products in preparing a meal.3 This article will suggest that actors in political society sometimes use "toleration" and its cognates to describe a requirement that involves some positive attitudes or actions-beyond mere noninterference, non-suppression, and the like.To be clear, my dialectical aim in making this observation is not to challenge the standard analysis. 4 In a variety of other cases, it seems intuitive that an exclusively negative interpretation of the allowance condition is sufficient for toleration. How best to analyze the term is not my present interest. Rather, this article aims to address an independently important normative phenomenon: the value of our relationships with other members of our political communities. Political philosophers have long attended to moral significance of treating fellow citizens as "free and equal co-authors" of the law.5 Of course, this rich idea has also become the source of much debate, and my aim is also not to comment on how its suggestive appeal can be translated into a determinate standard of legitimacy or moral acceptability. I invoke the idea here only to call attention to the