Autonomy &amp; Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism

Mundy, Jacob

doi:10.1080/03056240600842875

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…9 A key element to exiled Tibetans' claims to legitimacy on the international stage has been the leadership's avowal of non-violence as a political strategy. For its part, whilst Polisario's insistence on remaining an armed movement has exposed it to potentially delegitimising allegations from its opponents that it is a terrorist organisation, the movement also encourages non-violent resistance in the Moroccan-controlled areas (Mundy, 2006). Yet it is striking that in both cases narratives and practices of violence/non-violence are riddled with contradictions.…”

Section: Sources Of Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tibet's exiles in India do not have official status as refugees (Garratt, 1997;McConnell, 2013a) whereas Sahrawi refugees in Algeria do, albeit the UNHCR is kept somewhat at arm's length by Polsario. The fact that Polisario is an armed movement and combines (the potential for) armed resistance with non-violent demonstrations in the Moroccan-controlled areas (Mundy, 2006) also contrasts with the exiled Tibetan leadership's promotion of and adherence to a strict policy of non-violence (Ardley, 2002;McConnell, forthcoming 2014). Significantly, Polisario controls some 20% of its claimed territory and performs some governance activities there (it deploys its army, administers SADR law from a court in Mijek, provides schooling and health care, and hosts political events and national commemorations).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Constructing legitimacy without legality in long term exile: Comparing Western Sahara and Tibet

Wilson

McConnell

2015

Geoforum

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While scholars agree that political legitimacy, or the legitimacy to rule, is sought by governing authorities, the concept itself is often considered to be problematically vague. This article explores how the very ambiguity of the concept of legitimacy may make it 'good to think with'. Calling into question two problematic assumptions in discussions of legitimacy -whether legitimacy is the prerogative of state authorities, and whether legality is a necessary basis from which to make claims for legitimacy -this article uses the cases of two exiled governing authorities, for Western Sahara and Tibet, to examine how legitimate government can be produced in the absence of full legality as a recognised sovereign state. Attending to similarities and differences between these governments-in-exile we trace the sources of political legitimacy in each case and the techniques through which legitimacy is constructed in exile. Key to this has been the enactment of forms of rational-legal authority, including the establishment of statelike bureaucracies, the provision of services to their diasporic populations and aspirations to develop democratic structures. With the latter presented as a strategy both of securing internal legitimacy and of being seen to adhere to international norms of 'good governance', legitimacy in these cases emerges not so much as an achieved status, but as a set of techniques of government. We conclude by reflecting on how liminality -both territorially in terms of displacement and legally in terms of lack of full recognition -can counter-intuitively provide creative grounds for producing legitimacy.

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Section: Sources Of Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constructing legitimacy without legality in long term exile: Comparing Western Sahara and Tibet

Wilson

McConnell

2015

Geoforum

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“…They live side by side with a Moroccan settler population, believed to outnumber the Sahrawi population there, and a heavy Moroccan military presence. 8 Since 1999, many annexed Sahrawis have participated in demonstrations against Morocco's annexation, and, since 2005, this resistance has coalesced into what nationalist Sahrawis call their own Intifada (Mundy 2006). Sahrawi nationalist activism has met with repression from the Moroccan authorities (Human Rights Watch 2008UN CAT 2011).…”

Section: On the Margins: Western Saharamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, like Arab Spring uprisings driven by a popular demand for an alternative, elected government, Gdeim Izik protestors endorsed demands for democratic participation. The demonstrations began in non-violent form, in line with the non-violent means employed throughout the 'Sahrawi Intifada' (Mundy 2006). The first casualty, the 14-year-old Sahrawi boy killed on 24 October, died at the hands of the Moroccan security forces.…”

Section: Seen and Unseenmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Margins Of the arab spring

Wilson¹

2013

Social Analysis

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“…One is associated with the country's 'Islamist problem'; the other comes from the growing upsurge of discontent associated with Saharawi nationalism and stalled progress in resolving the Western Sahara situation. 49 It is difficult to assess precisely the extent of Morocco's Islamist problem and the sort of threat that it poses to the country, as it tends to be exaggerated or played down by different interests groups. Moroccan terrorism hit the headlines in May 2003 when the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group was thought to be behind five bombings in Casablanca (12 suicide bombers) that killed 33 people.…”

Section: Threats To Morocco's Stability 48mentioning

confidence: 99%

Security & insecurity in North Africa

Keenan¹

2006

Review of African Political Economy

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The article analyses the North African security situation over the last 15 or so years, but especially since the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, which provided the pre-emptive basis for the launch of Washington's global ‘War on Terror’. The article explains how and why the US, in collaboration with its lead ally in the region, Algeria, and with the cognisance of France and other European powers, duplicitously fabricated a new front in the ‘war on terror’ across the Sahara and Sahel, bringing an entirely new dimension to the nature and meaning of ‘terrorism’ in North Africa. Far from furthering political stability, security and democracy, as the Bush administration has proclaimed, Washington's attempt to establish itself as the elite power in the region has taken North Africa and most of the Sahel into a dangerous spiral of increased authoritarianism and repression, increased regional instability and insecurity, increased popular resentment of both Washington and the regimes of the region and the increased threat of militant extremism. The article shows how the US has not been able to get its own way willy-nilly in the region, but has instead found itself running up against a whole raft of pressures and conflicts, many of its own making, which reflect both existing and new forms of political opposition and organisation. In focusing on labour and resource issues, especially those connected with oil and gas production, the article highlights the links between abundant oil, rents and the aggrandizement of the authoritarian state at the expense of autonomous civil society. The article concludes by suggesting that the US is unable to maintain its power and position in North Africa as a result of what is turning into a classic case of imperial over-reach.

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Autonomy & Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism

Cited by 6 publications

References 1 publication

Constructing legitimacy without legality in long term exile: Comparing Western Sahara and Tibet

Constructing legitimacy without legality in long term exile: Comparing Western Sahara and Tibet

On the Margins Of the arab spring

Security & insecurity in North Africa

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