Autonomie angesichts epistemischer Abhängigkeit Kant über das Zeugnis anderer

Kant and the Enlightenment's Contribution to Social Epistemology

“…In the following sections, I shall argue that the role of sociality in Kant"s epistemology runs deeper than theadmittedly ambiguousremarks in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment perhaps led Schmitt to believe. In doing so, I shall draw on, and expand on, recent work on Kant"s epistemology of testimony (Gelfert 2006;Scholz 2001) as well as on other scholarly contributions, ranging from renewed interest in Kant"s anthropology ( e.g., Zammito 2002) to recent contributions to social epistemology. While the present paper is intended as both a contribution to the history of philosophy and to (systematic) social epistemology, it risks being neither; in particular, there is a very real danger of overinterpretation, given that many of the most fascinating of Kant"s remarks on social-epistemological questions take the form of philosophical vignettes rather than elaborate arguments.…”

Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony

“…Through the experience of other people we become certain by means of faith. Someone who presents something real as true, so that another takes it to be true, is called a witness (testis), and his action a 6 For citations of the material on testimony contained in Kant's lectures, and for a discussion of the background of Kant's writings on testimony, I am indebted to Oliver Scholz [2001], particularly pp. 834-8.…”

“…6 6 For citations of the material on testimony contained in Kant’s lectures, and for a discussion of the background of Kant’s writings on testimony, I am indebted to Oliver Scholz [2001], particularly pp. 834–8.…”

The stage on which our ingenious play is performed: Kant's epistemology of Weltkenntnis

“…For Kant's notion of testimony and its relevance for a theory of knowledge, see also Gelfert (2006). Also Scholz (2000) can be very helpful in understanding the epistemic limits of testimony in Kant's view. 17 In The Blomberg Logic (Ak 24:245-246) we find the following passage: "Just because the whole of men's commercium would be removed if no one asserted the truth, since then no one would trust anyone else; because a lie is something harmful, too, and asserting the truth is the most certain path for avoiding disdain.…”