2011
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25271-6_12
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Automated Verification of Executable UML Models

Abstract: We present a fully automated approach to verifying safety properties of Executable UML models (xUML). Our tool chain consists of a model transformation program which translates xUML models to the process algebra mCRL2, followed by symbolic model checking using LTSmin. If a safety violation is found, an error trace is visualised as a UML sequence diagram. As a novel feature, our approach allows safety properties to be specified as UML state machines.

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Cited by 17 publications
(17 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
(52 reference statements)
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“…(e.D2U & 0b101) = 0b101 ∧ s.ACT = OPEN ∧ e.D2U = (e.D2U ⊕ 0b100) ∧ up(e).D2U = (up(e).D2U ⊕ 0b101) (19) Tail Movements. A tail movement can occur on a section e if it is occupied by a train and the tail of the train is within the section, while the head of the train is not in e. This means that e's occupancy status variable has the T and O bits set, and the H bit unset, i.e., its value is 0b011.…”
Section: Train Movements Transitionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…(e.D2U & 0b101) = 0b101 ∧ s.ACT = OPEN ∧ e.D2U = (e.D2U ⊕ 0b100) ∧ up(e).D2U = (up(e).D2U ⊕ 0b101) (19) Tail Movements. A tail movement can occur on a section e if it is occupied by a train and the tail of the train is within the section, while the head of the train is not in e. This means that e's occupancy status variable has the T and O bits set, and the H bit unset, i.e., its value is 0b011.…”
Section: Train Movements Transitionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conventionally, the development and verification process of interlocking systems is informal and mostly manual, and hence time-consuming, costly, and error-prone. Automated verification of interlocking systems is therefore an active research topic, investigated by several research groups, see e.g., [20,17,38,25,19,24]. As part of the RobustRailS research project, 3 our work aims at establishing a holistic method supporting the verification of such systems.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, full formal verification of interlocking systems demands heavy if not infeasible computational resources 2 , a phenomenon known as the state explosion problem. The pioneering research in model checking and in applying model checking to the domain of railways [3][4][5]7,9,20] has developed techniques allowing the verification of models of the interlocking systems controlling larger and highly-complex networks. For example, abstraction techniques can be applied at the domain modelling level before the model checking is performed [9].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a vital part of any railway signalling system and has the highest safety integrity level (SIL4) according to the CENELEC 50128 standard [1]. Automated safety verification of interlocking systems is hence an important issue and an active research topic, investigated by several research groups, see e.g., [3,4,5,9,21]. Model-checking techniques are considered for this purpose, but, notwithstanding the important advancements witnessed for these techniques, they fail to give results on large interlocking systems due to the state space explosion problem.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%