Automated gaze-contingent objects elicit orientation following in 8-month-old infants.

Deligianni, Fani; Senju, Atsushi; Gergely, György; Csibra, Gergely

doi:10.1037/a0025659

Cited by 93 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(39 reference statements)

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“…Infants at both ages looked longer at the empty location if the agent had looked at it than if she had not, showing that they expected the agent to look at a location occupied by a referent object rather than at an empty location. Furthermore, Deligianni, Senju, Gergely, and Csibra (2011) in an automated eye tracker-based study used an infantinduced contingent reactivity paradigm to demonstrate that 8-month olds gaze follow an unfamiliar object's bodily orientation response toward one of two targets, but only if the object had been reacting contingently before (producing self-propelled body movements such as tilting) to being looked at by the infant (see also Movellan & Watson, 2002;Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998, for similar results with 10-and 12-month olds).…”

Section: Preverbal Infants' Receptivity To Ostensive Referential Commmentioning

confidence: 72%

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

Gergely¹,

Jacob

2012

Rational Constructivism in Cognitive Development

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Section: Preverbal Infants' Receptivity To Ostensive Referential Commmentioning

confidence: 72%

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

Gergely¹,

Jacob

2012

Rational Constructivism in Cognitive Development

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“…In contrast, the current study used natural non-speech sounds familiar to infants, which may have helped them distinguish non-communicative from communicative sounds. Further, in contrast to previous studies (Augusti et al, 2010;Bakker et al, 2010;von Hofsten et al, 2009), the design of the current experiments did not involve contingent reactions, which, if contingent on infants' own behavior, can lead them to infer communication even from non-human, non-verbal agents (Deligianni, Senju, Gergely, & Csibra, 2011). Instead, both experiments controlled for contingency between the actors so that it could not influence infants' gaze patterns.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

1- and 2-year-olds’ expectations about third-party communicative actions

Thorgrimsson

Fawcett

Liszkowski

2015

Infant Behavior and Development

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a b s t r a c tInfants expect people to direct actions toward objects, and they respond to actions directed to themselves, but do they have expectations about actions directed to third parties? In two experiments, we used eye tracking to investigate 1-and 2-year-olds' expectations about communicative actions addressed to a third party. Experiment 1 presented infants with videos where an adult (the Emitter) either uttered a sentence or produced non-speech sounds. The Emitter was either face-to-face with another adult (the Recipient) or the two were back-to-back. The Recipient did not respond to any of the sounds. We found that 2-, but not 1-year-olds looked quicker and longer at the Recipient following speech than nonspeech, suggesting that they expected her to respond to speech. These effects were specific to the face-to-face context. Experiment 2 presented 1-year-olds with similar face-to-face exchanges but modified to engage infants and minimize task demands. The infants looked quicker to the Recipient following speech than non-speech, suggesting that they expected a response to speech. The study suggests that by 1 year of age infants expect communicative actions to be directed at a third-party listener.

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“…In converging experiments using a gaze-following measure, Johnson et al (2008) found that, after observing the blob turn toward one of two targets, 14-to 15-month-olds turned in the same direction if the blob first "conversed" with an experimenter (agent condition), but not if it beeped and the experimenter remained silent (non-agent condition). Deligianni, Senju, Gergely, and Csibra (2011) extended these results to 8-month-olds, who turned in the same direction as a novel non-human object only if it first interacted with them contingently (i.e., produced a specific response when they fixated it).…”

Section: How Do Infants Identify Non-human Agents?mentioning

confidence: 88%

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

Baillargeon¹,

Scott²,

He³

et al. 2015

APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 1: Attitudes and Social Cognition.

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IntroductionConsider the following scene: A man wearing a backpack is pacing leisurely back and forth in a large airport room. As he strolls, he occasionally crosses his arms, twirls the dangling straps of his backpack, or stuffs his hands in his pant pockets. At one point, he sits down, takes off his backpack, and removes from it a bag filled with assorted gummy bears; as he peers intently inside the bag, he selects and eats, one at a time, five red gummy bears.As adults, we would have no difficulty interpreting the man's actions. We might view his initial actions-pacing, crossing his arms, and so on-as intentional (as opposed to accidental) though not as directed toward any particular goal. In contrast, we might perceive his subsequent actions-removing the bag of gummy bears from his backpack and eating five red ones in succession-as both intentional and goal-directed. In analyzing these actions, we might build an explanation that attributes to the man a causally coherent set of motivational and epistemic mental states: He wants to eat gummy bears, he is particularly fond of red ones, and so when he spies one in the bag, he removes it and eats it.Next, consider a new scene: As the man is happily chewing on red gummy bears, he notices a second man approaching who is carrying two heavy suitcases. At this point, our scene might unfold according to different scenarios. In one, the first man greets the second man, offers to carry one of the suitcases, and holds out his bag of gummy bears. In another scenario, the first man continues to watch the second man but makes no move to approach him. In yet another scenario, the first man sticks out a leg to trip the second man, causing him to fall heavily.As adults, we would interpret and evaluate the first man's actions in the three scenarios very differently. In the first scenario, we might infer that the two men have a social group in common: They might be friends, coworkers, or relatives, for example. In the second scenario, we 3 would conclude that the two men are strangers. In both the first and second scenarios, we would view the first man's behavior as acceptable: Offering help and sharing food are expected prosocial behaviors in interactions with ingroup, but not outgroup, individuals. In contrast, the first man's behavior in the third scenario would seem to us beyond the pale: Unprovoked harmful actions, even against outgroup individuals, are generally viewed as unacceptable. We would categorize the first man as an antisocial lout, and we might file away distinctive characteristics as possible markers of a social group to be avoided in the future.Our discussion of the two scenes above illustrates the rich analyses that adults spontaneously engage in when watching others act. What are the developmental origins of these interpretations? Over the past 25 years, there has been a great deal of research on social cognition in infancy. This research can be roughly organized into two sets of questions that map neatly onto the two scenes above. First, when watching an agen...

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Automated gaze-contingent objects elicit orientation following in 8-month-old infants.

Cited by 93 publications

References 32 publications

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

1- and 2-year-olds’ expectations about third-party communicative actions

Psychological and sociomoral reasoning in infancy.

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