Between December 2010 and March 2011 a local Tunisian protest against an aging dictator spread to Egypt and then to Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria and at a lower intensity to several other countries (Lynch, 2012). These protests involved a remarkable number of commonalities in slogans, timing, and methods, and self-conscious framing of events as a common "Arab" narrative. Yemeni protestors, for instance, quickly adopted Egyptian slogans or took heart from Libyan opposition advances. This Arab uprising represents a critical case for theories of the international diffusion of protest movements and regime change (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Hale, 2013; Solingen, 2012; Zhukov and Stewart, 2013). The early Syrian uprising modeled itself after counterparts across the region, employing similar rhetorical frames, attempting to seize public places without arms, presenting a civic, non-sectarian and non-Islamist face at home and abroad, and in some cases hoping to attract a NATO intervention like Libya's. Many likely expected Bashar al-Asad's regime to succumb to a similar fate as those of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali (Anden-Papadopolous and Pantti, 2013; Leenders, 2012; Leenders and Heydemann, 2012). As Syria's conflict evolved towards a mixture of protest and civil war, while uprisings in Arab Spring leaders such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen themselves struggled, Syria became far more of a polarizing issue with a higher degree of sectarian rather than pan-Arab identity narratives. How did Syria's popular uprising of 2011 fit within the broader regional wave of Arab uprisings in early 2011, commonly termed the "Arab Spring"? Existing theories of protest diffusion and regime change cascades emphasize the importance of geographic proximity. The pattern of uprisings in Arab countries in early 2011 only partially fits