Authority after Emergency Rule

White, Jonathan

doi:10.1111/1468-2230.12130

Cited by 50 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…The set‐up of new crucial policies of intergovernmental origin during the crisis, distinct from the supranational single market policies, has led to a “dual” constitutional regime (Fabbrini, ). Established in a situation of “state of exception,” a “crisis law” (Joerges, ) emergency regime (Dyson, ; White, ) led to an unconventional and discretionary (White, : 87) decision making system, informal, and undeclared (Joerges & Kreuder‐Sonnen, : 4), yet with lasting effects on the constitutional balance of the EU (Dawson & de Witte, ). The proliferation of emergency measures taken outside of the EU's constitutional framework compromised the very idea of integration‐through‐law and indicates rather a “disintegration of law” (Scicluna, ).…”

Section: Asymmetric Intergovernmentalism and The Imposition Of A “Dismentioning

confidence: 99%

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

Papadopoulos¹,

Piattoni²

2019

European Policy Analysis

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In this contribution to the symposium “What's the problem? Multilevel governance and problem‐solving,” we discuss possible reasons that make difficult for the European Semester to achieve the goals of developing mutual learning and the acquisition of “ownership” over fiscal restraint, budgetary coordination and structural reforms. We underscore the uneasy coupling of a “soft” multilevel governance mode with “hard” forms of governance associated with power politics and domination. We claim that four major problems undermine the Semester's credibility and effectiveness: (1) a democratic deficit resulting from executive dominance, the relative sidelining of parliaments and the marginalization of the public, which confine learning to governmental and administrative circles; (2) the constitutionalization of budgetary policy choices, which constrains the available policy options and preempts reflection and discussion; (3) the “disciplinary logic” imposed through asymmetric intergovernmentalism, which invites noncompliance or bargaining, and (4) the “tough” treatment of debtor Eurozone members outside the Semester.

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Section: Asymmetric Intergovernmentalism and The Imposition Of A “Dismentioning

confidence: 99%

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

Papadopoulos¹,

Piattoni²

2019

European Policy Analysis

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“…Related to this complexity issue has been the tendency of the EU and member states to act around, beyond, or even outside the existing EU constitutional framework in the Eurozone crisis (Kilpatrick, , pp. 333–337; White, , p. 588). It is debatable whether the tendency toward extraconstitutional choices has resulted in a genuine state of emergency or exception at the transnational level (cf.…”

Section: Losing Control: the State Of Emergency And Global Constitutimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is noteworthy that the sovereign status of member states does not exculpate the EU proper in swerving toward constitutional exceptionalism (White, , p. 603; cf. Joerges, , pp.…”

Section: Losing Control: the State Of Emergency And Global Constitutimentioning

confidence: 99%

Control by aggregation? Critical reflections on global constitutionalism in the shadow of looming transnational emergency powers

Kuo

2019

Constellations

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“…As a corollary, another set of reconstructive approaches has looked into the longer-term consequences of these legal and institutional transformations for the EU's overall authority structures (see White, 2015a). ECB bond-buying programmes; bailouts) and intrusive (e.g.…”

Section: Critical Reconstruction: From State Of Exception To Authoritmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Troika conditionalities) measures were adopted by reference to emergency conditions that are difficult to reconcile with the originally existing legal order. As a corollary, another set of reconstructive approaches has looked into the longer-term consequences of these legal and institutional transformations for the EU's overall authority structures (see White, 2015a). In substantive terms, a number of resulting accountability problems stand out in particular.…”

Section: Critical Reconstruction: From State Of Exception To Authoritmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Integration Theory: The (Anti‐)Constitutional Dimension of European Crisis Governance

Kreuder-Sonnen

2016

J of Common Market Studies

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Political science analyses of the governance of the euro crisis largely build on conventional theories of European integration to account for the extent to which institutional developments either reflect supranationalism, inter‐governmentalism or historical path‐dependencies. This analytical focus captures the usual integration dynamics and institutional design outcomes, but overlooks the constitutional dimension of how the crisis affects the EU's legal order. In this agenda‐setting article, I draw attention to legal scholarship that highlights important deviations from the EU's ‘legal normalcy’. Legal studies find that a number of emergency measures were taken on an extra‐legal basis and through quasi‐autocratic procedures. Normative reconstructions interpret this practice as a form of transnational state of exception which transitions into permanent traits of authoritarianism in the EU's legal order. I argue that their findings offer a new terrain for political science research which transcends the explanatory categories of integration theory.

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Authority after Emergency Rule

Cited by 50 publications

References 56 publications

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

The European Semester: Democratic Weaknesses as Limits to Learning

Control by aggregation? Critical reflections on global constitutionalism in the shadow of looming transnational emergency powers

Beyond Integration Theory: The (Anti‐)Constitutional Dimension of European Crisis Governance

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