Authoritarian state building through political decentralization and local government law: Evidence from the Islamic Republic of Iran

Abstract

What motivates ideological authoritarian regimes to permit subnational elections? What mechanisms do these regimes employ to ensure that local electoral outcomes are favorable to the regime? Focusing on the decision to create a new tier of elected local government and the use of local government law, I argue that national elites can use local elections to strengthen state-building through increased institutionalization of mass political participation and by integrating local populations into the ambit of state controlled public goods provision. I illustrate this argument by analyzing elected local government in the Islamic Republic of Iran. I show how the state’s legal framework successfully constrains local actors in three contested domains: the scope of political participation, the extent of legislative authority, and the degree of fiscal autonomy. A major implication of these findings is that expanding participation through subnational elected government in an ideological Islamist regime contributes to authoritarian nation-state building. ¿Qué motiva a los regímenes autoritarios ideológicos a permitir elecciones subnacionales? ¿Qué mecanismos emplean para asegurarse de que los resultados de las elecciones locales les son favorables? Argumentamos aquí que las elites nacionales pueden utilizar las elecciones locales para fortalecer la construcción del Estado a través de una creciente institucionalización de la participación política masiva y de la integración de poblaciones locales en el ámbito de las provisiones de bienes controlados por el Estado. Ilustramos ese argumento con un análisis del gobierno local electo en la República Islámica de Irán. El marco jurídico del Estado limita a los agentes locales en la participación política, la autoridad legislativa y la autonomía fiscal. Una importante implicación de estos hallazgos es que la expansión de la participación a través de un gobierno subnacional electo en un régimen ideológico islamista contribuye a la construcción del Estado-nación autoritario.

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