2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2020.101531
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Authoritarian energy transitions undermined? Environmental governance cycles in China’s power sector

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Cited by 21 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…The literature mentioned that energy and the environment have spatial dimensions because pollution is a global phenomenon [27]. While talking about the energy sector transition, political systems, and governance, Alkon and Wong [28] mentioned that decentralization could improve economic prospects for a country. However, it can hinder the performance of the environmental governance structure, and tension between centralized and decentralized political systems can result in cyclicity in the energy system governance.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literature mentioned that energy and the environment have spatial dimensions because pollution is a global phenomenon [27]. While talking about the energy sector transition, political systems, and governance, Alkon and Wong [28] mentioned that decentralization could improve economic prospects for a country. However, it can hinder the performance of the environmental governance structure, and tension between centralized and decentralized political systems can result in cyclicity in the energy system governance.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is competition for environmental governance policies among local governments in China, and the characteristics of "race to the bottom" are more significant. Although the Chinese government has made great progress in environmental governance, the implementation of environmental regulations in China is considered a challenging task (Alkon & Wong, 2020). Local cadres are apt to pursue GDP growth under the decentralized system and original incentive structure, thus leading to the ineffective enforcement of environmental regulation (Ran et al, 2017).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Political incentives prompt local governments to prioritize economic growth at the expense of environmental benefits (Shih et al, 2012;Peng et al, 2019). Also, the regular rotation of local officials creates inherent tensions between the pursuit of economic growth and environmental sustainability (Alkon and Wong, 2020;Eaton and Kostka, 2014). To pursue their own economic interests, local officials may form alliances with economic entities such as state-owned enterprises to implement symbolic pollution-reducing policies, such as only imposing a nominal fine (van Rooij, 2006;Zhang et al, 2010;Lo et al, 2012).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%