Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I

Abstract

I am delighted to accept the invitation from the editorial board of the Journal of Genocide Research to discuss Marvin Fried's new book. I have read the book as carefully and closely as possible. Nevertheless, as is often the case, my comments are to a great extent a reflection of my own research interests and their intersections with Fried's book. The book made me think again about the critical relationship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and it also got me thinking about the trajectories between the First and Second World Wars in the Balkan region, and of the possibility of comparing cultures of violence in 1914-18 with those of 1941-45. There is much more to be said about the many topics that Fried's book raises, and no doubt other contributors will pick up on points that go unmentioned here. Let me first give the work its due praise. Fried's monograph is a fine example of the small renaissance taking place in the field of diplomatic history in recent years. It is based on meticulous research conducted in archives across central Europe and in several languages. Fried demonstrates a keen understanding of the discussions about how and why political and military elites conduct war in the modern period. In this respect it is reminiscent of Christopher Clark's major study of the origins of the First World War, The Sleepwalkers, and it will undoubtedly be mentioned alongside this work in forthcoming discussions of the diplomatic history of the First World War. 1 Like The Sleepwalkers, Fried puts Austria-Hungary and the Balkans at the centre of the narrative of the First World War. No longer a secondary player or waiting in the wings as the real action takes place elsewhere, Austria-Hungary is now a primary protagonist in the war's drama; and the Balkans are centre stage. The following formulation summarizes fairly well how far Fried wishes to rewrite the traditional script of the First World War: 'if Austria-Hun-gary's willingness to stand by its German ally until the end kept Germany in the war by allowing it to fight on without encirclement, Vienna's Balkan aspirations had kept Austria-Hungary in the war in the first place' (p. 3; and, with minor changes, p. 232). This was of decisive importance for the demise of Austria-Hungary too: 'consistently offensive war aims in the Balkans … helped lead to the eventual destruction of the Empire' (p. 3). These are bold and challenging claims both on the international history of the First World War and on the late history of the Habsburg Empire. Along with comparisons to Clark's opus, Fried's book can be read alongside the new histories of late Habsburg history that seek to dislodge narratives of the monarchy's 'eternal decline' down the centuries. I am thinking here of the work of

Assessing the asymmetric war-growth nexus: A case of Afghanistan

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