Austria

Grünbichler, Andreas

doi:10.4337/9781781954348.00014

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The role of the financial blurring effect in explaining the reform of the supervisory architecture is highlighted in Grunbichler (2005) for Austria, Schuler (2005) for Germany, Prast (2005) for The Netherlands. Masciandaro (2005, 2007) and Masciandaro and Quintyn (2007) performed empirical analyses on the determinants of supervisory reforms, checking the robustness of the financial blurring effect.…”

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confidence: 99%

Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and trends

Masciandaro

Nieto

Prast

2007

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

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If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services. AbstractPurpose -This paper aims to analyse the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country-specific factors, using a path-dependence approach? Design/methodology/approach -The paper performs an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks' prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities). Findings -The paper concludes that supervisors in central banks are more likely to be publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely to be funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank-oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. Practical implications -In general, the paper does not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition. Originality/value -The paper analyses the financial governance of banking supervision in a sample of 90 countries world-wide. The empirical analysis focuses on the financing rules and identifies factors that explain the differences between supervisory authorities.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and trends

Masciandaro

Nieto

Prast

2007

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

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“…The establishment of the unified supervisor, the Financial Market Authority (FMA) improved independence and accountability arrangements significantly. Grünbichler (2005) explains how theses arrangements needed to be carefully tailored to stay within the confines of Austrian constitutional law. In his view, the agency received as much independence as feasible under the constitution.…”

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“…Exposure rules to large borrowers are often relaxed to allow specific industries or companies to survive.12 Sometimes, independent central banks have been granted an exception from the constitutional ruling and are allowed to issue binding regulations over their specific sector. Austria is a case in point (seeGrünbichler, 2005).…”

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The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors

Taylor

Quintyn²,

Ramirez³

2007

IMF Working Papers

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E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants

Masciandaro

2006

Open Econ Rev

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This paper presents an analysis of recent trends and determinants in the architectures of financial supervision, focused on the authorities design. We propose a path dependence approach to study the single authority versus multi-authority dilemma, considering the level of financial supervision consolidation as the dependent variable. In particular, in a movement towards full consolidation in supervision, one can think of two sharp alternatives: a monopolist central bank or a pure single financial authority. Given that the degree of supervision consolidation seems to be inversely correlated with central bank involvement in supervision itself, the paper sheds light on the possible explanation of this trade-off. The trade off is tested using Probit techniques with a sample of 68 countries. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006financial supervision, single authority, central bank,

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Austria

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and trends

Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and trends

The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors

E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants

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