The Job Services Australia era (2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015) was a distinct stage in the evolution of Australia's employment services because it was then that "work-first" payment by results contracts, in combination with demanding "work-first" activation, resulted in "punitive activation". Experiences of this shift were collected in interviews with a small cohort of job seekers about incidents involving threat of sanction.These incidents involving threat of sanction were construed as moments where job seekers were directly exposed to the coercive authority of activation workers deployed to meet "work-first" targets. The findings show that "work-first" marketisation incentives combined with demanding "work-first" activation led to an experience of "punitive activation".activation, active labour market programs, employment services, sanctions, welfare conditionality
| INTRODUCTIONOver the last 20 years, active labour market programmes have evolved so that unemployed workers, called "job seekers", have had increasingly stricter conditions placed on the receipt of welfare payments. Australia's labour market programmes have reflected this shift to stricter welfare conditionality and have also been a location where the privatisation of employment services led to a competitive "quasi-market". In this quasi-market, "work-first" contract conditions were established with economic incentives intended to ensure that employment services were getting people into jobs quickly (Davidson, 2011).This article contends that Job Services Australia (JSA) era (2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015) was a notable stage in the evolution of punitive activation, because it was then that "work-first" marketisation was