2004
DOI: 10.1023/b:busi.0000037530.25174.30
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Auditors' Willingness to Advocate Client-Preferred Accounting Principles

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Cited by 15 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Although auditors often support ambiguous reporting decisions (Shafer et al, 2004), they must be willing to confront their clients to improve the honesty and reliability of disclosure in the MD&A. For example, suggest that to improve the quality and honesty of the disclosure of the MD&A, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) should mandate that auditors and the audit committee discuss and evaluate each of the elements of the MD&A for its consistency with verifiable outside sources.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although auditors often support ambiguous reporting decisions (Shafer et al, 2004), they must be willing to confront their clients to improve the honesty and reliability of disclosure in the MD&A. For example, suggest that to improve the quality and honesty of the disclosure of the MD&A, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) should mandate that auditors and the audit committee discuss and evaluate each of the elements of the MD&A for its consistency with verifiable outside sources.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The central question in the debate regarding auditor tenure is whether long-term relationships between clients and their auditors reduce audit quality. Long-term auditor-client relationships have been blamed for causing auditors to acquiesce to client demands, resulting from reduced auditor independence (Shafer et al 2004). Acquiescence to client requests may result from auditors not wanting to lose the client before recuperating costs invested in the audit process (i.e., start-up costs) (DeAngelo 1981), or wanting to please the customer (Shafer et al 2004).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Owing to various economic circumstances surrounding corporations, accounting standards provide for more than one acceptable accounting treatment for a range of operations. Nevertheless, it seems that auditors are susceptible to subordinating their professional judgment by accepting the client-preferred accounting treatment (Kadous et al , 2003; Shafer et al , 2004; Ng and Shankar, 2010) [2]. This situation appears to be a concern for standard setters, who accordingly require that auditors notify those charged with governance when the practices management has used are not wholly appropriate for the audited entity even though they may be acceptable under the standards (IFAC, 2009, ISA 260.16a; CPA Canada, 2019, CAS 260.16a).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%