2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2013.12.007
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Audit committee financial expertise, corporate governance, and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

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Cited by 41 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…Since the decision to use an incumbent auditor for tax services is endogenously determined, some studies examine the rationale for procuring tax services from incumbent auditors. Albring et al (2014) find that corporate governance attributes, such as board independence, the audit committee's accounting expertise, and separation of the CEO and chairman of the board, play a role in a firm's decision to switch to a non-auditor provider for tax services. Lassila et al (2010) provide evidence that firms with strong corporate governance and relatively high levels of tax and operational complexity are more likely to retain their auditor for tax services.…”
Section: Empirical Modelmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Since the decision to use an incumbent auditor for tax services is endogenously determined, some studies examine the rationale for procuring tax services from incumbent auditors. Albring et al (2014) find that corporate governance attributes, such as board independence, the audit committee's accounting expertise, and separation of the CEO and chairman of the board, play a role in a firm's decision to switch to a non-auditor provider for tax services. Lassila et al (2010) provide evidence that firms with strong corporate governance and relatively high levels of tax and operational complexity are more likely to retain their auditor for tax services.…”
Section: Empirical Modelmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Allowing pharmacists to adjust the dosage of some prescribed medications (Martinez et al, 2013) can create ripples through the system that only a systemic mindset may be able to fathom. Sometimes such new rules are formulated in the wake of major catastrophes or watershed events, such as the requirements that audit and consulting firms operate at arm's length (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002;Albring et al, 2014) following the Enron-Andersen disaster or the development of a code of ethics for civil engineers adopted after the Kansas City Hyatt Regency collapse (Pfatteicher, 2000). These examples merely hint at an avenue that his better adapted to the PS environment than controls, and more effective than "gentle nudges.…”
Section: Emergence Control and Influencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, it has been an unresolved debate concerning the potential importance/ effect of board members' equity ownership on both the board functional performance and firm performance. Albring et al (2013), opined that in the USA, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), among others, suggests that director stock ownership should reduce agency problems and therefore the need for external monitoring. Thus, in an attempt to make a proper alignment of the interest of director and shareholders, many boards have implemented stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements for directors, leading to a substantial rise in the ownership of managers and directors but in Nigeria, there exist ambiguities and challenges regarding the directors share ownership status (CBN, 2008).…”
Section: Board Equity Ownership (Moderator)mentioning
confidence: 99%