Auctions for the Safe, Efficient, and Equitable Allocation of Airspace System Resources

Ball, Michael O.; Smith, Robert H.; Donohue, George; Hoffman, Karla

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0021

Cited by 74 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982) showed how combinatorial auction design is suitable for airport slot auctions and highlighted the associated efficiency gains through experiments. Since then, several researchers (Cramton et al, 2007;Ball, Donohue, and Hoffman, 2006;Dot Econ Ltd., 2001;Harsha, 2008, to name a few) have shown the advantages of slot auctions. The reader is referred to Ball, Donohue, and Hoffman (2006) and Harsha (2008) for detailed accounts of various commonly raised concerns regarding slot auctions and ways of addressing them.…”

Section: Slot Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since then, several researchers (Cramton et al, 2007;Ball, Donohue, and Hoffman, 2006;Dot Econ Ltd., 2001;Harsha, 2008, to name a few) have shown the advantages of slot auctions. The reader is referred to Ball, Donohue, and Hoffman (2006) and Harsha (2008) for detailed accounts of various commonly raised concerns regarding slot auctions and ways of addressing them. In spite of the many attractive properties of the auctioning mechanisms, an auction by itself does not alleviate airport congestion, but rather allocates a fixed set of resources in a more efficient way.…”

Section: Slot Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation

Vaze

Barnhart

2012

Transportation Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Demand often exceeds capacity at the congested airports. Airline frequency competition is partially responsible for the growing demand for airport resources. We propose a game-theoretic model for airline frequency competition under slot constraints. The model is solved to obtain a Nash equilibrium using a successive optimizations approach, wherein individual optimizations are performed using a dynamic programming-based technique. The model predictions are validated against actual frequency data, with the results indicating a close fit to reality. We use the model to evaluate different strategic slot allocation schemes from the perspectives of the airlines and the passengers. The most significant result of this research shows that a small reduction in the total number of allocated slots translates into a substantial reduction in flight and passenger delays, and also a considerable improvement in airlines' profits.

show abstract

Section: Slot Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Slot Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation

Vaze

Barnhart

2012

Transportation Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As airports become more congested, governments are turning to market-based approaches to allocate landing and takeoff slots. For instance, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration recently commisioned a study on the use of an auction to allocate slots at New York's congested LaGuardia airport (Ball, Donohue, & Hoffman, 2006). This problem is large scale when it expands to include airports throughout the U.S., and eventually the World, exhibits self-interest (airlines are profit-maximizing agents with private information about their utilities for different slot allocations), and is one in which privacy is a major concern because of the competitiveness of the airline industry.…”

Section: Example Social Choice Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems

Petcu¹,

Faltings²,

Parkes³

2008

jair

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem as a distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP), in which each agent can communicate with other agents that share an interest in one or more variables. Whereas existing DCOP algorithms can be easily manipulated by an agent, either by misreporting private information or deviating from the algorithm, we introduce M-DPOP, the first DCOP algorithm that provides a faithful distributed implementation for efficient social choice. This provides a concrete example of how the methods of mechanism design can be unified with those of distributed optimization. Faithfulness ensures that no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from any aspect of the protocol, neither informationrevelation, computation, nor communication, and whatever the private information of other agents. We allow for payments by agents to a central bank, which is the only central authority that we require. To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report information, and send messages that is in its own best interest. Determining agent i's payment requires solving the social choice problem without agent i. Here, we present a method to reuse computation performed in solving the main problem in a way that is robust against manipulation by the excluded agent. Experimental results on structured problems show that as much as 87% of the computation required for solving the marginal problems can be avoided by re-use, providing very good scalability in the number of agents. On unstructured problems, we observe a sensitivity of M-DPOP to the density of the problem, and we show that reusability decreases from almost 100% for very sparse problems to around 20% for highly connected problems. We close with a discussion of the features of DCOP that enable faithful implementations in this problem, the challenge of reusing computation from the main problem to marginal problems in other algorithms such as ADOPT and OptAPO, and the prospect of methods to avoid the welfare loss that can occur because of the transfer of payments to the bank.

show abstract

“…For this reason, they have attracted considerable attention in the auction literature that is reviewed by Abrache et al [6], Blumrosen and Nisan [7], Bichler et al [8], and Ho man [9], to name a few. Combinatorial auctions have various applications, such as auctioning airport time slots and resources [10], truckload transportation [11], bus routes [12], advertising time slots [13,14], spectrum licenses [15], and timber allocation [16]. Some researchers have reported that applying combinatorial auctions to companies' procurement processes can lead to signi cant savings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selecting unique suppliers through winner determination in combinatorial reverse auction: scatter search algorithm

Alaei

Setak

2017

Scientia Iranica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. In this paper, a combinatorial reverse auction mechanism is proposed to select suppliers for the required items of a company. As a contribution, it is assumed that the task of supplying each required item is indivisible to multiple suppliers, or the company prefers to select only one supplier for supplying each required item. So, the winner determination process is done in such a way that supplying each tendered item is assigned to only one potential supplier. The corresponding winner determination problem is formulated as a binary integer program which is an NP-complete combinatorial optimization problem. Since exact methods have failed to solve this kind of problems in a reasonable time, a meta-heuristic algorithm called scatter search is proposed to nd feasible and near-optimal solutions to the formulated winner determination problem. To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, several instances of the problem with di erent real-world sizes are randomly generated and solved, using the proposed algorithm with tuned parameters. Computational results show that the proposed scatter search method performs well in solving the problem instances.

show abstract

Auctions for the Safe, Efficient, and Equitable Allocation of Airspace System Resources

Cited by 74 publications

References 8 publications

Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation

Modeling Airline Frequency Competition for Airport Congestion Mitigation

M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems

Selecting unique suppliers through winner determination in combinatorial reverse auction: scatter search algorithm

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About