2006
DOI: 10.1007/s11036-006-5192-y
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Auction-Based Spectrum Sharing

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Cited by 547 publications
(395 citation statements)
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References 16 publications
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“…Auctions are particularly suitable for the information asymmetry scenario. With a well-designed auction, buyers (bidders) have the incentive to bid for the resource in a truthful manner, and the seller can allocate the resource efficiently without knowing the buyers' private information in advance (see, e.g., Huang et al (2006), Li et al (2008), Gandhi et al (2007), Wang et al (2010), Zhou et al (2008), Zhou & Zheng (2009)). However, the above work considers the secondary spectrum trading in a pure spectrum market (i.e., either spot or futures market).…”
Section: Secondary Spectrum Trading For Dsamentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Auctions are particularly suitable for the information asymmetry scenario. With a well-designed auction, buyers (bidders) have the incentive to bid for the resource in a truthful manner, and the seller can allocate the resource efficiently without knowing the buyers' private information in advance (see, e.g., Huang et al (2006), Li et al (2008), Gandhi et al (2007), Wang et al (2010), Zhou et al (2008), Zhou & Zheng (2009)). However, the above work considers the secondary spectrum trading in a pure spectrum market (i.e., either spot or futures market).…”
Section: Secondary Spectrum Trading For Dsamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Auction: Huang et al (2006), Gandhi et al (2007), Li et al (2008), Wang et al (2010), Zhou et al (2008), Zhou & Zheng (2009).…”
Section: Spot Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [10] the relay and filter design mechanism is discussed which is useful in orthogonal frequency modulation for cognitive radio network by Donggun Kim, Youngchul Sung and Jihoon Chung. The parameters are defined for the channel sensing for PU and SU.…”
Section: In [4] "A Strategy-proof Combinatorial Heterogeneous Channelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Game models have been developed to model the behavior of secondary users accessing the idle spectrum, and obtain a multiple access solution or equilibrium in the CRN [59][60][61]. In particular, a spectrum auction is a typical economic model for dynamic spectrum sharing [62]. Another strong model is machine learning, which decides on the available spectrum by learning from the spectrum decision experience [63].…”
Section: Optimized Decision In a Crnmentioning
confidence: 99%