Attributions as inferences and explanations: Effects on discounting.

Abstract

Observers assessing the probability of an interpretation for a behavioral event may (a) assess the probability that certain inferences can be drawn from the event (inference set) or (b) assess the probability that some explanation can cause the event (explanation set). We suggested that inference set subjects would be more likely than explanation set subjects to discount less plausible interpretations in favor of more plausible interpretations. In three studies observers either estimated the probability that some inferences can be drawn from an event or estimated the probability that some explanation can be the cause for the event. As predicted, the inference set produced a higher level of discounting. Studies 1 and 3 also showed that future-oriented observers made attributions similar to those made in the inference set. However, this effect was open to alternative interpretations in Study 1 and failed to reach statistical significance in Study 3. There was also an indication that inference set subjects were more likely to make correspondent attributions. Additional tests of the effects of time orientation and the possible relation between the inference-explanation distinction and actor-observer differences were discussed.The common attribution task requires observers to provide an interpretation for some behavioral event. A great deal is known about the factors that influence the outcomes of this task. In contrast, the meta-theory of the attribution process has attracted less attention. What do observers look for when they search for an interpretation? What do observers estimate when they assess the probability of an interpretation? What is an interpretation? These questions represent an important yet relatively unknown aspect of attribution theory.Recently, Zuckerman, Eghrari, and Lambrecht (1986) suggested that an interpretation for an event can be seen either as an inference that might be drawn from the event or as an explanation leading to the event. They also suggested that whether observers search for an inference or for an explanation determines a set, which then affects the nature of the attribution process. In an inference set, observers estimate whether some knowledge can be derived from the event. This estimate approximates the probability that certain factors are present if the behavior is present (i.e., the probability that the inference is a necessary condition). In an explanation set, observers estimate the likelihood that a cause or reason could produce the event. This estimate approximates the probability that certain factors can produce the event (i.e., the probability that the explanation is a sufficient condition). Note that the probabilities defining the two attribution sets are only approximated. We think that the logic of necessary and sufficient causes represents an abstract ideal of what observers do. It is unlikely, however, that this logic serves as an explicit criterion for formulating or testing inferences and explanations.

Promotion and prevention focus on alternative hypotheses: Implications for attributional functions.

“…Having established that people's regulatory focus influences their tendency to discount causal explanations, the next question is how it affects the inferences that people draw from these explanations. As we discussed earlier, people who consider only a limited number of explanations and discount the alternatives are likely to be more committed to the remaining explanation or explanations and use them more in subsequent inferences than people who maintain a greater number of possibilities and do not engage in discounting (Zuckerman et al, 1988). Study 5 was designed to test this prediction.…”

“…likely to be more committed to the remaining explanation or explanations and use them more in subsequent inferences than people who maintain a greater number of possibilities and do not engage in discounting (Zuckerman et al, 1988). Study 5 was designed to test this prediction.…”

“…Our analysis questions the generality of this attributional function. When individuals in a prevention focus engage in discounting, their level of confidence in the remaining alternative reflects a belief not only in its sufficiency to produce the effect but also in its necessity (see also Zuckerman et al, 1988, for a discussion of the relation between discounting and necessity beliefs). Thus, individuals in a prevention focus are more likely than individuals in a promotion focus to translate their ratings of the high plausibility of a cause into an assertion about its existence and to use it to predict outcomes in other situations.…”

Certainty-Related Beliefs and Depressive Symptomatology: Concurrent and Longitudinal Relationships

“…Although researchers often have not drawn a dis tinction between causal attributions and predictions, in part because attributions to stable, internal factors have been assumed to result in more certain predictions of similar future behavior, recent research suggests that this assumption may not always be valid (Jackson, Sulli van, & Hodge, 1993). Moreover, attributions and predictions have been shown to rely on different sets of information and to have different time perspectives (Zuckerman, Eghrari, & Lambrecht, 1986;Zuckerman et al, 1988). Attributions appear to entail a focus on multiple sufficient causes and on past events and outcomes; the more causes that can be found for a past event, the greater the resulting understanding of it.…”

Impression valence constrains social explanations: The case of discounting versus conjunction effects.

“…Initial attempts to explicate the determinants of discounting versus conjunction centered on the perceivers' processing mode. Zuckerman and his colleagues maintained that when people infer the probability of an explanation given an observed behavior, they attend to causal necessity and show discounting effects, whereas people inferring the probability of a behavior given an explanation attend to sufficiency and prefer conjunctive explanations (Zuckerman, Eghrari, & Lambrecht, 1986; Zuckerman et al, 1988; see also Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Subsequent research has not, however, supported the assertion that conjunction effects occur only for predictive tasks: Both discounting and conjunction may occur when the task involves judging the causes of a particular behavior (Morris et al, 1998).…”