Attributional style in a case of Cotard delusion

McKay, Ryan; Cipolotti, Lisa

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.06.001

Cited by 60 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Only a few studies have assessed “NDE-like” phenomena in non-life threatening situations (Gabbard et al, 1981; Owens et al, 1990; Gabbard and Twemlow, 1991; Kelly, 2001; Facco and Agrillo, 2012). Such accounts have also been reported in epileptic patients (Hoepner et al, 2013), syncope (Lempert et al, 1994), intense grief and anxiety (Kelly, 2001), Cotard's syndrome (McKay and Cipolotti, 2007; Charland-Verville et al, 2013) and during meditative state (Beauregard et al, 2009). It remains unclear whether NDEs occurring in life-threatening or non-life threatening situations differ in intensity or core features.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Near-death experiences in non-life-threatening events and coma of different etiologies

Charland‐Verville

Jourdan²,

Thonnard

et al. 2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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Background: Near death experiences (NDEs) are increasingly being reported as a clearly identifiable physiological and psychological reality of clinical significance. However, the definition and causes of the phenomenon as well as the identification of NDE experiencers is still a matter of debate. To date, the most widely used standardized tool to identify and characterize NDEs in research is the Greyson NDE scale. Using this scale, retrospective and prospective studies have been trying to estimate their incidence in various populations but few studies have attempted to associate the experiences' intensity and content to etiology.Methods: This retrospective investigation assessed the intensity and the most frequently recounted features of self-reported NDEs after a non-life-threatening event (i.e., “NDE-like” experience) or after a pathological coma (i.e., “real NDE”) and according to the etiology of the acute brain insult. We also compared our retrospectively acquired data in anoxic coma with historical data from the published literature on prospective post-anoxic studies using the Greyson NDE scale.Results: From our 190 reports who met the criteria for NDE (i.e., Greyson NDE scale total score >7/32), intensity (i.e., Greyson NDE scale total score) and content (i.e., Greyson NDE scale features) did not differ between “NDE-like” (n = 50) and “real NDE” (n = 140) groups, nor within the “real NDE” group depending on the cause of coma (anoxic/traumatic/other). The most frequently reported feature was peacefulness (89–93%). Only 2 patients (1%) recounted a negative experience. The overall NDE core features' frequencies were higher in our retrospective anoxic cohort when compared to historical published prospective data.Conclusions: It appears that “real NDEs” after coma of different etiologies are similar to “NDE-like” experiences occurring after non-life threatening events. Subjects reporting NDEs retrospectively tend to have experienced a different content compared to the prospective experiencers.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Near-death experiences in non-life-threatening events and coma of different etiologies

Charland‐Verville

Jourdan²,

Thonnard

et al. 2014

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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“…9 Cotard syndrome usually extends to the delusion of being dead or dying; however, this denial of self-existence is absent in nearly a third of patients. 9 Although most commonly associated with negative self-attribution from psychotic depression, 9,10 Cotard syndrome can be associated with cognitive deficits from neurological disease. Reported causes include Parkinson's disease, migraine, brain tumors, traumatic brain injury, arteriovenous malformations, multiple sclerosis, and encephalitis.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cotard Syndrome in Semantic Dementia

Mendez

Ramı́rez-Bermúdez

2011

Psychosomatics

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Background Semantic dementia is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by the loss of meaning of words or concepts. semantic dementia can offer potential insights into the mechanisms of content-specific delusions. Objective The authors present a rare case of semantic dementia with Cotard syndrome, a delusion characterized by nihilism or self-negation. Method The semantic deficits and other features of semantic dementia were evaluated in relation to the patient's Cotard syndrome. Results Mrs. A developed the delusional belief that she was wasting and dying. This occurred after she lost knowledge for her somatic discomforts and sensations and for the organs that were the source of these sensations. Her nihilistic beliefs appeared to emerge from her misunderstanding of her somatic sensations. Conclusion This unique patient suggests that a mechanism for Cotard syndrome is difficulty interpreting the nature and source of internal pains and sensations. We propose that loss of semantic knowledge about one's own body may lead to the delusion of nihilism or death.

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“…This would result in a fundamentally altered experience of the world, in light of which the belief that one has died might not seem so outlandish. Although on the face of it this proposal is perhaps more credible than the Young et al attributional hypothesis, a recent study by McKay and Cipolotti (2007) found evidence consistent with the latter*namely, a pronounced internalising attributional bias in a patient with Cotard delusion. More research is needed here*in particular, it would be useful to investigate whether Cotard patients do in fact show deficits in autonomic arousal, and if so whether these deficits are restricted to facial stimuli or whether they involve a more global loss of autonomic responsiveness to all familiar stimuli.…”

Section: Motivational Accounts Of Delusionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: Motivational factors and false claims

McKay¹,

Kinsbourne²

2010

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

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False claims are a key feature of confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia. In this paper we consider the role of motivational factors in such claims. We review motivational accounts of each symptom and consider the evidence adduced in support of these accounts. In our view the evidence is strongly suggestive of a role for motivational factors in each domain. Before concluding, we widen the focus by outlining a tentative general taxonomy of false claims, including false claims that occur in clinical settings as well as more garden-variety false claims, and incorporating both motivational and nonmotivational approaches to explaining such claims.Keywords: Anosognosia; Confabulation; Delusion; Motivational processes Patients in neurological and psychiatric settings are known to make rather striking claims. Consider the following two examples:1. ''I am the left foot of God.'' 2. ''My father is 95Á96. My mother is 10 years younger so she is 85Á86.'' The first claim is striking because it is bizarre and grandiose, but also because the individual who made it was a brilliant mathematician who went on to win a Nobel prize (see Nasar, 1998 Moscovitch, 1995, p. 228). How are we to account for such claims? And how can we characterise them? According to the scientific literature, the first example is considered to reflect a delusion (David, 1999), whereas the second is a paradigmatic instance of confabulation arising in the context of memory impairment (Moscovitch, 1995). The problem from a theoretical perspective is that it is not clear what the distinctions are between these two classes of symptom, nor what the nature of the overlap is between them, if any. This is most obvious when one considers that certain patient presentations are thought of as involving delusion in some circles, and confabulation in others. An example is anosognosia, which involves unawareness or denial of disease or disability, in particular denial of left hemiplegia following right-hemisphere brain damage. Recent authors have explicitly characterised this condition as either delusion (e.g., Aimola Davies, Davies, Ogden, Smithson, & White, 2009;Davies, Aimola Davies, & Coltheart, 2005) or confabulation (e.g., Heilman, 2009;Hirstein, 2005).One feature common to confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia is that each of these symptoms typically involves some sort of false public claim. There may be exceptions to this*for example, delusions are usually conceptualised as false beliefs (cf. Hamilton, 2007;Stephens & Graham, 2004), and beliefs can be kept private. On the other hand, it is typically because of the public declarations of deluded individuals that delusions attract clinical attention. Another exception involves the fact that delusions and confabulations might be, as it were, ''serendipitously'' true. A patient may lack access to his biographical information, yet by chance may confabulate the correct answer when asked his age. Such exceptions aside, false claims are a key feature of these disorders. Our primary aim in this paper is to consider t...

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Attributional style in a case of Cotard delusion

Cited by 60 publications

References 73 publications

Near-death experiences in non-life-threatening events and coma of different etiologies

Near-death experiences in non-life-threatening events and coma of different etiologies

Cotard Syndrome in Semantic Dementia

Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: Motivational factors and false claims

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