Attribution and reciprocity

Sebald, Alexander

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004

“…Such instrumental procedural preferences are proposed and investigated by Sebald (2010) and Aldashev et al (2010). Reciprocal workers should then reduce e↵ort specifically if fully informed managers force them to implement project Manager-High.…”

Section: And Schmidt (1999)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004), Sliwka (2007), and Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008) outline some general theoretical models of reciprocity. Aldashev et al (2010) and Sebald (2010) show theoretically in the framework of intention-based reciprocity how the delegation of decision rights to an explicit randomization device can reduce attribution and thus unkind reciprocal reactions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights

Sloof

¹

,

Siemens

²

2015

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Organizations must not only take the right decisions, they must also ensure that these decisions are effectively implemented. Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that the same members of many organization are often responsible for both decision initiation and implementation. If these have social preferences, they might thus sabotage both project choices and implementation to express their discontent with the allocation of decision rights. How decisions come about also affects implementation if workers have reciprocal fairness concerns. Our experimental evidence demonstrates that the possibility to sabotage implementation leads to more delegation, but only if workers have high costs of obstructing informed decisions. We further find that the allocation of authority as such affects implementation. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: C910, D230, D860, L200.

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“…They also illustrate that deleting unused actions can affect the equilibrium structure. A series of papers, including Sebald (2010) and Aldashev et al (2010), introduce randomization devices into psychological games, but still under the assumption of perfect observability. Von Siemens (2009, online appendix) contains a model of intentions for a two-stage bargaining game with incomplete information about the second-mover's social type.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Design and Intentions

Bierbrauer

¹

,

Netzer

²

2012

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We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility results such as the one by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) are turned into possibility results. Second, we provide a systematic account of the welfare implications of kindness sensations. Finally, we turn to an environment without common knowledge of social preferences and introduce the notion of a psychologically robust mechanism. Such a mechanism can be implemented without information about the type or the intensity of social preferences. We show that the mechanisms which have been the focus of the conventional mechanism design literature can be modified to achieve psychological robustness.

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“…Among the literature that focusses on DP in contests and tournaments, the following papers offer a theoretical framework which explicitly models DP. Konow (2003) argues that individuals distinguish between different variables that are potentially relevant to justice on the basis of attribution theory, which implies that people evaluate the extent to which an agent has contributed to the outcome of the interaction (see also Sebald (2010)). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests

Hoffmann

¹

,

Kolmar

²

2017

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as higher than effort with standard, selfish preferences. These findings can explain three anomalies in empirical tests of the probabilistic prize-seeking game, namely the large variance of effort levels (overspreading), individual spending that exceeds the Nashequilibrium prediction (overspending), and aggregate spending that exceeds the value of the prize (overdissipation), and they are also in line with the findings for share contests. If players are sufficiently heterogeneous, the game has a unique equilibrium that is more egalitarian than the standard, selfish Nash equilibrium. It turns out that the less talented competitor may win the larger share of the prize if his inequality aversion is sufficiently strong. We analyze how the equilibria evolve if the number of players gets larger and how sequential moves influence behavior. Two new insights follow from the analysis of the sequential-move game. First, sequential moves act as a coordination device if there are multiple simultaneous equilibria, and second the inequality aversion of the more egalitarian player can be used as a commitment device for low effort. This effect can reverse the conventional wisdom that the underdog should lead. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D030, D720, D740.

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Attribution and reciprocity

Cited by 63 publications

References 19 publications

Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights

Decision Initiation, Decision Implementation, and the Allocation of Decision Rights

Mechanism Design and Intentions

Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests

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