Attributing Cyber Attacks

Rid, Thomas; Buchanan, Benjamin R.

doi:10.1080/01402390.2014.977382

Cited by 376 publications

(165 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In a general case, the problem of detection of anomalies, cyber-attacks or threats to MCCS boils down to the following [1,3,9,14,24,28,29]. Certain set of objects is explored, in our case this is PA − the number of possible targets from the side that attacks MCCS.…”

Section: The Model Of Logical Procedures Of Detection Of Anomalies Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of adaptive system of detection of cyber-attacks, based on the model of logical procedures and the coverage matrices of features

Lakhno

Kazmirchuk

Kovalenko

et al. 2016

EEJET

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Section: The Model Of Logical Procedures Of Detection Of Anomalies Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of adaptive system of detection of cyber-attacks, based on the model of logical procedures and the coverage matrices of features

Lakhno

Kazmirchuk

Kovalenko

et al. 2016

EEJET

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“…The strategic component of attributing cyberattacks has been studied in the context of single attacks against specific systems using game theory (27)(28)(29)(30), but these models do not account for the larger sociopolitical landscape. This broader context has been studied qualitatively using a variety of models (15,31,32). Attribution from an economic perspective was studied by ref.…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many of the known attribution methods for cyber can be spoofed (15). Unlike biological or nuclear events, digital records can be copied, altered, created, or deleted; identities can be faked; and attacks can be disguised as accidents or incompetence.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

Edwards

Furnas

Forrest

et al. 2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Cyber conflict is now a common and potentially dangerous occurrence. The target typically faces a strategic choice based on its ability to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator and whether it has a viable punishment at its disposal. We present a game-theoretic model, in which the best strategic choice for the victim depends on the vulnerability of the attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each player about their opponent. The resulting blame game allows analysis of four policy-relevant questions: the conditions under which peace (i.e., no attacks) is stable, when attacks should be tolerated, the consequences of asymmetric technical attribution capabilities, and when a mischievous third party or an accident can undermine peace. Numerous historical examples illustrate how the theory applies to cases of cyber or kinetic conflict involving the United States,

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“…However, this particular problem may have been oversold somewhat. Cyber intelligence capabilities are improving (Rid & Buchanan 2014) and the anonymity of large-scale attacks is difficult to maintain (Lindsay, 2015a, b, 56).…”

Section: Damage Limitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Warfighting for Cyber Deterrence: a Strategic and Moral Imperative

Lonsdale

2017

Philos. Technol.

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Theories of cyber deterrence are developing rapidly. However, the literature is missing an important ingredient-warfighting for deterrence. This controversial idea, most commonly associated with nuclear strategy during the later stages of the Cold War, affords a number of advantages. It provides enhanced credibility for deterrence, offers means to deal with deterrence failure (including intrawar deterrence and damage limitation), improves compliance with the requirements of just war and ultimately ensures that strategy continues to function in the post-deterrence environment. This paper assesses whether a warfighting for deterrence approach is suitable for the cyber domain. In doing so, it challenges the notion that warfighting concepts are unsuitable for operations in cyberspace. To do this, the work constructs a conceptual framework that is then applied to cyber deterrence. It is found that all of the advantages of taking a warfighting stance apply to cyber operations. The paper concludes by constructing a warfighting model for cyber deterrence. This model includes passive and active defences and cross-domain offensive capabilities. The central message of the paper is that a theory of victory (strategy) must guide the development of cyber deterrence.

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Attributing Cyber Attacks

Cited by 376 publications

References 14 publications

Design of adaptive system of detection of cyber-attacks, based on the model of logical procedures and the coverage matrices of features

Design of adaptive system of detection of cyber-attacks, based on the model of logical procedures and the coverage matrices of features

Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame

Warfighting for Cyber Deterrence: a Strategic and Moral Imperative

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