Attitude Psychology and Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

Virtue ethicists and epistemologists have generally presumed that virtue and vices are real psychological states or traits amenable to empirical study. There is, however, no agreement on the psychological constructs that may play this role. This chapter introduces the apparatus of attitude psychology that, in the author’s view, supplies a theoretical framework suitable to understand those intellectual vices which in Chapter 2 have been described as defects in epistemic agency. The approach throws light on the affective, motivational, and cognitive dimensions of the vices which are under scrutiny in this book. The chapter provides an overview of key concepts in attitude psychology including that of an attitude as a summary evaluation of its object. It makes a case that attitudes are the causal bases of intellectual virtues and vices. It concludes by addressing various objections to the framework and briefly addresses the questions raised by the situationist criticism of virtue epistemology.

Deepfakes, Intellectual Cynics, and the Cultivation of Digital Sensibility

“…First, they often reflect poor or deficient motivations towards engaging in knowledge-related practices. Call this the motivational account (Tanesini, 2018; 2021). Second, they systematically obstruct responsible inquiry and the transmission of knowledge.…”

Cultivating Curiosity in the Information Age

“…As such, the virtuously curious person exhibits a kind of intellectually virtuous humility . Unlike attentiveness, intellectual humility has received significant attention from virtue epistemologists in recent years (Roberts and Wood, 2007; Hazlett, 2012; Kidd, 2015; Whitcomb et al, 2017; Tanesini, 2021). Prominent accounts differ to some degree, particularly concerning the question of whether intellectual humility is best understood as an absence of the vices of pride (Roberts and Wood, 2007) or the presence of a particular ability, namely, the ability to recognize and ‘own’ one's intellectual limitations (Whitcomb et al, 2017).…”

“…The rise of extremism in various forms, increased political polarization, and post-truth conspiracy theorising are just three phenomena that appear to expose particular failures of intellectual humility in the contemporary epistemic and political landscape. The cultivation of intellectual humility is viewed by numerous commentators as a viable characterological strategy to address at least one underlying cause of these, and other issues (Baehr, 2011; Hazlett, 2012; Kidd, 2015; Lynch, 2017; Tanesini, 2018; 2021; Pritchard, 2021).…”

“…The existence and nature of these multiple threats to epistemic and political life, moreover, can be in part attributed to the novel technologies of the Information Age, including via mechanisms such as online ‘echo chambers’ and ‘bubbles’, which shield users from ideas and information that may challenge or undermine their own convictions. The interaction between novel technologies and novel expressions of vices such as arrogance and ‘superbia’ (Tanesini, 2021) is a rich topic for investigation. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that intellectual humility is an important virtue to cultivate in the social and political climate of the twenty-first century.…”

Integrity as the Goal of Character Education

“…People who are ethically arrogant might consider themselves superior to other people in their ability to decide on the best course of action. This would be a form of what Alessandra Tanesini calls ‘superbia’ and can be manifested in treating other people as ethically inferior to oneself (2021, pp. 13–14, 98–100).…”