Attention and the art of scientific publishing

Klamer, Arjo; Dalen, H.P. van

doi:10.1080/1350178022000015104

Cited by 80 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The quality of articles differs enormously across the entire spectrum of scholars if one takes the number of citations as an approximation of the quality of an article (Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002). By using signals authors can make clear to their potential audience that they are dealing with a quality idea and grab the attention of readers so they will invest time in reading the article.…”

Section: Signaling In Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Signals in science - On the importance of signaling in gaining attention in science

2005

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Which signals are important in gaining attention in science? For a group of 1,371 scientific articles published in 17 demography journals in the years 1990-1992 we track their influence and discern which signals are important in receiving citations. Three types of signals are examined: the author's reputation (as producer of the idea), the journal (as the broker of the idea), and the state of uncitedness (as an indication of the assessment by the scientific community of an idea). The empirical analysis points out that, first, the reputation of journals plays an overriding role in gaining attention in science. Second, in contrast to common wisdom, the state of uncitedness does not affect the future probability of being cited. And third, the reputation of a journal may help to ge t late recognition (so-called 'sleeping beauties') as well as generate so-called 'flash-in-the-pans': immediately noted articles but apparently not very influential in the long run. Terms of use: Documents in1

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Section: Signaling In Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Signals in science - On the importance of signaling in gaining attention in science

2005

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“…By integrating some concepts from evolutionary theory with game theory, a number of preliminary conjectures become plausible surrounding the competition for the kinds of attention valued in the academy. Scholars compete for both attention and the resources that attend to such attention (Klamer & van Dalen, 2002). As preliminary macro-level orienting axioms, therefore, the GTA may be summarized as follows: P 1 : Positively-valenced disciplinary attention is positively related to acquisition of valued resources (Aaltio, 2009).…”

Section: Getting Propositionedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing the Game: An Architectonic Analogue for Meta-Theorizing Academic Activities

Spitzberg

2018

SMC

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A radical reformulation is proposed for explaining paradigm fragmentation. The broader topography of academic activities is conceptualized according to an academic game-theoretic analogue (GTA). According to this analogue, scholarly and academic activities reflect a competitive field of play and of plays. Criteria such as attention, compensation, awards, publications, tenure, and mobility become the scarce valued resources distributed in the game based on the plays that players enact. In an effort to reveal the heuristic potential of the theoretical analogy, these threads are traced across a broad array of humanistic and scientific theories and scholarship, including connections among Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Goffman, Foucault, Bourdieu and Lyotard. The field of Communication, and its many affiliated and cognate disciplines have been charted by a wide variety of paradigm maps (e.g., Altman & Rogoff, 1987;Anderson & Baym, 2004;Craig, 1999;Smith, 1988). There is little doubt that the communication discipline is fragmented, multi-faceted and complex (Barnett, Huh, Kim, & Park, 2011, p. 467). In fields such as communication (Eadie, 2011;Salomón, 2010;Stanfill, 2012), sociology (Puddephatt & McLaughlin, 2015), political science (Blokland, 2015) and social psychology (Green, 2015), such fragmentation has been singled out as a threat to their disciplinary status and credibility. This analysis suggests an explanation for scholarly activities that provide the raw data for such variegated maps. The analogy of game theory provides a high-level explanation for academic and scholarly activities, and provides a meta-account of the raison d'etre of scholarly activity, which is to pursue such activity while seldom recognizing its game-like nature.Disciplinary paradigms appear to be organic, ever-evolving systems of people and ideas. Kuhn (1970) proposed that paradigms may consist of very small groups, even as small as a dozen or two members, who share either similar exemplars or collective practices and beliefs. Scholarly activities are sense-making activities and language communities. As paradigms evolve, scholars often engage in sense-making to organize such paradigms along dimensions and boundaries that reflect the respective relationships among such paradigms (Foucault, 1988). Maps of these relationships represent meta-sense-making activities of these academic territories. Granting that -the map is not the territory‖ (Korzybski, 1931, p. 58), meta-theoretical paradigm maps are intended to bring order to the diversity of academic and scholarly activities that constitute a discipline (Charland, 2003;Wang, 2014). These organizing efforts reflect 

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“…Interaction based theories are, however, not sufficient to understand science, one also has to explain how institutions -the rules by which the game of science is played -come about and change. In that respect, one can learn a lot from what sociologists of science teach us and slowly but gradually one can say the same about the economists of science who are making worthwhile contributions (see for overviews : Sent, 1999;Gans, 2000;and Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002).…”

Section: Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the institutions that helps scientists cope with the problem of exchange is the clustering in groups and discursive entities (Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002). Scientists cluster in universities, set up barriers to entry, organize professional associations in order to organize conferences and issue journals, constitute schools, subscribe to research programs, develop specialized research communities which will organize specialized conferences and issue specialized journals, and form networks of like-minded souls.…”

Section: Specializationmentioning

confidence: 99%