2008 International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security 2008
DOI: 10.1109/isecs.2008.103
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Attacks on Two Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols and an Improvement for Revocable Anonymity

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Cited by 9 publications
(7 citation statements)
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References 38 publications
(81 reference statements)
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“…In fact, while it is reasonable to assume that a TTP or a CP can perform complex security actions, it appears to be questionable to make the same assumptions for buyers, who should not be forced to perform actions that cannot be automatically carried out by plugins installed in their web browsers without a competent intervention. In particular, buyers should not be considered able to generate one-time anonymous public and private key pairs based on specific security parameters, or participate in group signature schemes and in interactive zero-knowledge proofs, or generate valid watermarks, or digitally sign or encrypt specific messages [30,50,60,61]. Such an assumption represents a necessary condition to consider a watermarking protocol suited for the current web context, because it is unthinkable that buyers have to do one of the complex actions reported above, if they want to purchase content on the Internet.…”
Section: Design Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, while it is reasonable to assume that a TTP or a CP can perform complex security actions, it appears to be questionable to make the same assumptions for buyers, who should not be forced to perform actions that cannot be automatically carried out by plugins installed in their web browsers without a competent intervention. In particular, buyers should not be considered able to generate one-time anonymous public and private key pairs based on specific security parameters, or participate in group signature schemes and in interactive zero-knowledge proofs, or generate valid watermarks, or digitally sign or encrypt specific messages [30,50,60,61]. Such an assumption represents a necessary condition to consider a watermarking protocol suited for the current web context, because it is unthinkable that buyers have to do one of the complex actions reported above, if they want to purchase content on the Internet.…”
Section: Design Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the main challenges in designing watermarking protocols consists of accurately defining the role played by TTPs in the purchase transactions, since TTPs could collude with the other parties involved in the protocols [17,20,40] so as to impair them. In this regard, the best solution would be to totally eliminate TTPs from protocols.…”
Section: Main Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, such a solution is not always possible, since protocols often need TTPs to validate specific data, or some phases of the protocol, or, for example, the plug-ins that have to be downloaded and installed in the buyers' web browsers to complete the purchase transactions [22,23]. Furthermore, when TTPs play a limited role in the protocols, buyers end up being forced to perform complex security actions to complete the purchase transactions, and this makes the protocols impractical for the web context [17][18][19][20][21][40][41][42][43][44].…”
Section: Main Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Among the issues and attacks to be considered [27], our protocol is more concerned by: the "issue of non-repudiation" where the physician or the expert denies the emission or reception of data; the "collusion attack" where both physicians cooperate to circumvent the protocol creating false evidence that acquit them; The "traceability issue" which aim is to identify the persons at the origin of a disclosure. We come back on each of them in the following.…”
Section: Security Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%