Attack detection in all-optical networks

Real Time Securing of All-Optical Networks Against Security Attacks at the Physical Level

“…An attacker can exploit the gain saturation property of EDFA by inserting a strong so that the legitimate signals can be deprived of the photons. However, according to equation (2), if input power changes, the corresponding change of pump power can compensate for loss of N 2 . Therefore, it is possible to maintain the gain of the legitimate channels by providing extra pump power when attack is detected.…”

“…Thus an in-band jammer who injects a signal on a single wavelength into a link using high power transmitter can destroy many signals on that wavelength since channels of the same wavelength from different fibers share the same switching plane. An attacker, a person internal to the network oran external remote person, can disrupt the operation of an optical node by exploiting these cross-talk characteristics of switches by injecting a very high power attack signal through the wavelength selective switch [2]. A second type of attack, known as gain competitionattack, exploits gain competition property of optical amplifiers.If an attacker injects a strong signal at a wavelength outside the communication band, but within the passband of the amplifier then the gains of the legitimate signals may be reduced considerably.…”

“…As a result the legitimate signals become weaker and weaker.The gain competition attack, also known as out-of-band jamming attack, can result in denial of service tolegitimate users. In some instances, it may be possible to deny service to manyusers from a legitimate network access point via the gain competition attack [2].…”

“…To foil the in-band and out-of-band jamming attacks in AON, some preventive countermeasures have been proposed in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] and [10] which are primarily focused on detection and attack localization, i.e., reactive approach. Three types of preventive countermeasure categories are primarily focused in [1]: 1) incorporating band limiting filters to thwart signals outside certain band to prevent out-of-band gain competition and reducing vulnerabilities intrinsic to hardware, 2) providing anti-jamming transmission schemes such as CDMA or TDMA that are hardened for anti-jamming and anti-tapping measures and 3) protocols and architecture designs adapted to AONs, such as avoiding compromised link for sensitive communications.…”

Monitoring cycles for fault detection in meshed all-optical networks

“…The optical power detection, optical spectral analysis, pilot tones and optical time domain reflectometry (OTDR) could be deployed for fault detection and also attack detection [2] in AONs.…”