Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

Pivato, Marcus

doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0971-2

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 61 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In other words, rather than using a simple majority rule, one should consider multi-option preferential voting rules [143], which have a higher probability of selecting an option that works for more people (including minorities). Such rules can increase the social welfare [144], which is desirable.…”

Section: Harnessing Collective Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

Ethics of Smart Cities: Towards Value-Sensitive Design and Co-Evolving City Life

et al. 2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The digital revolution has brought about many societal changes such as the creation of “smart cities”. The smart city concept has changed the urban ecosystem by embedding digital technologies in the city fabric to enhance the quality of life of its inhabitants. However, it has also led to some pressing issues and challenges related to data, privacy, ethics inclusion, and fairness. While the initial concept of smart cities was largely technology- and data-driven, focused on the automation of traffic, logistics and processes, this concept is currently being replaced by technology-enabled, human-centred solutions. However, this is not the end of the development, as there is now a big trend towards “design for values”. In this paper, we point out how a value-sensitive design approach could promote a more sustainable pathway of cities that better serves people and nature. Such “value-sensitive design” will have to take ethics, law and culture on board. We discuss how organising the digital world in a participatory way, as well as leveraging the concepts of self-organisation, self-regulation, and self-control, would foster synergy effects and thereby help to leverage a sustainable technological revolution on a global scale. Furthermore, a “democracy by design” approach could also promote resilience.

show abstract

Section: Harnessing Collective Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

Ethics of Smart Cities: Towards Value-Sensitive Design and Co-Evolving City Life

et al. 2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Pivato [31] demonstrates that social choice functions like Borda and approval voting are able to maximize the utility with high probability, when the agents satisfy certain properties. Rivest and Shen [35] use a game-theoretic model to compare two voting systems and develop a randomized mechanism that is always preferred to any other voting system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences

Anshelevich¹,

Postl²

2017

jair

206

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to the mechanisms (and possibly even to the agents themselves), which means we cannot simply select the optimal alternative, i.e. the alternative that minimizes the total agent cost (or median agent cost). However, we do assume that the agents know their ordinal preferences that are induced by the metric space. We examine randomized social choice functions that require only this ordinal information and select an alternative that is good in expectation with respect to the costs from the metric. To quantify how good a randomized social choice function is, we bound the distortion, which is the worst-case ratio between expected cost of the alternative selected and the cost of the optimal alternative. We provide new distortion bounds for a variety of randomized mechanisms, for both general metrics and for important special cases. Our results show a sizable improvement in distortion over deterministic mechanisms.

show abstract

“…The utilitarian view, which assumes that the voters have costs for each alternative, is a well-known approach in welfare economics (Roemer, 1998;Ng, 1997) and has received attention from the AI community during the past decade (Procaccia & Rosenschein, 2006;Boutilier et al, 2015;Brânzei et al, 2013;Pivato, 2016;Anshelevich & Postl, 2017;Caragiannis et al, 2017;Goel et al, 2017;Gross et al, 2017;Amanatidis et al, 2020;Caragiannis & Procaccia, 2011). Procaccia and Rosenschein (2006) first introduced distortion as a benchmark for measuring the efficiency of a social choice rule in utilitarian settings.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Distortion Value of Elections with Abstention

Seddighin

Latifian

Ghodsi

2021

jair

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In Spatial Voting Theory, distortion is a measure of how good the winner is. It has been proved that no deterministic voting mechanism can guarantee a distortion better than 3, even for simple metrics such as a line. In this study, we wish to answer the following question: how does the distortion value change if we allow less motivated agents to abstain from the election? We consider an election with two candidates and suggest an abstention model, which is a general form of the abstention model proposed by Kirchgässner. Our results characterize the distortion ¨ value and provide a rather complete picture of the model.

show abstract

Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

Cited by 12 publications

References 61 publications

Ethics of Smart Cities: Towards Value-Sensitive Design and Co-Evolving City Life

Ethics of Smart Cities: Towards Value-Sensitive Design and Co-Evolving City Life

Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences

On the Distortion Value of Elections with Abstention

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About